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Fault Detection, Isolation and Identification of Formation Flying
Satellites using Wavelet-Entropy and Neural Networks
Farshid Faal
The main objective of this thesis is to develop a fault detection, isolation and
identification (FDII) scheme based on Wavelet Entropy (WE) and Artificial Neural
Network (ANN) for reaction wheels (RW) that are employed as actuators in the
attitude control subsystem (ACS) of a satellites to perform the formation flying (FF)
missions. In this thesis two FDII approaches are proposed, i) Spacecraft-level fault
diagnosis and ii) Formation-level fault diagnosis.
In the "spacecraft-level" fault diagnosis scheme in order to analysis faults, abso-
lute attitude and angular measurements from a satellite are considered as diagnostic
signals. In order to detect the fault, the wavelet-entropy technique is employed on
diagnostic signals and the sum of the absolute wavelet entropies (SAWE) of the diag-
nostic signals are obtained and compared with an appropriately selected threshold. If
the SAWE passes the threshold the faulty condition is established. In order to isolate
the fault in a satellite the angular velocity measurements in a satellite are consid-
ered as diagnostic signals and the relative wavelet energy (RWE) of these signals are
obtained and compared to a threshold. In our proposed fault identification scheme,
the attitude measurements in a satellite are considered and the detail and approxi-
mation coefficients of the wavelet signals are obtained and these coefficients are used
as inputs to an artificial neural network to identify the type of the fault in a satellite.
Using a confusion matrix evaluation system we demonstrate that our spacecraft-level
FDII can detect, isolate and identify the high severity faults in a satellite however
this scheme cannot detect low severity faults in a satellite.
iii
Our proposed "formation-level" FDII scheme utilizes data collected from the rel-
ative attitudes and relative angular velocity measurements of the formation flying
satellites. In this fault diagnosis scheme, the relative attitude and relative angular
velocity measurements in a satellite with respect to each its neighbor’s in a formation
are considered as diagnostic signals. In order to detect the fault, the relative attitude
measurements in a satellite are considered as diagnostic signals. The wavelet-entropy
technique is utilized on diagnostic signals and the SAWEs with respect to each satel-
lite’s neighbor are obtained. These SAWEs are then compared with an appropriately
selected threshold. The faulty satellite is determined if these SAWEs pass the thresh-
olds. In order to isolate the fault in a faulty satellite, the relative angular velocity
measurements are considered as diagnostic signals. The RWE of these signals are
obtained and compared to a threshold. In our proposed fault identification scheme,
the relative attitude measurements in a satellite are considered as diagnostic signals.
In this scheme, the RWEs of the diagnostic signals are obtained and used as inputs to
an artificial neural network to identify the type of the fault in a satellite. According
to the simulation results, our proposed FDII scheme can detect, isolate and identified
both low severity and high severity faults in the reaction wheels of satellite.
iv
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1.1 Statement of the Problem
The concept and associated challenges of spacecraft flying in formation have been
studied since the early days of the space program. Only recently, however, has the
idea of formation flying been applied to autonomous satellites [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8]. The
development of multiple cooperating spacecraft has the potential to significantly ex-
pand the functionality, performance and reduce the overall operational costs. For
instance, a formation of interferometric imaging spacecraft can achieve an optical
imaging system with an aperture of kilometers long yielding the resolution that is
required to image planets in the other solar systems.
A formation of small satellites would be cheaper to develop and launch, but could
still perform the tasks of a large, single satellite mission through proper task dis-
tribution [9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16]. The system would exhibit gradual performance
degradations as individual satellites fail and tasks are redistributed, rather than the
total mission termination that is faced by single satellites during component failures.
By adding inexpensive replacement satellites, the cluster could be returned to
full mission specifications. In addition, reconfiguring the relative positions of the
constituent satellites in situ would permit a formation to engage in multiple mission
objectives. Finally, the capability of obtaining multiple simultaneous measurements
along a large baseline would enable satellite formations to accomplish goals that are
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difficult or impossible to achieve with a single satellite [100].
There are a number of formation flying missions for deep space environment (such
as ST-3, TPF, LISA, DARWIN [17,18,19] and formation flying missions for near-Earth
environment (EO-1, ION-F, PRISMA, CLS3, SMART-2 [19,20,21,22,23,24,25]). In
formation flying spacecraft, precise formation keeping during the execution of the
mission and collision avoidance between the agents of the formation during maneuvers
are some of the important and critical issues that must be considered in all missions.
These issues can be fulfilled with appropriate control laws and precise sensors and
actuators.
However, malfunction of any of these components can affect the performance of
the formation. Thus, early detection of faults is mandatory for this type of mission.
In general, faults are defined as deviations from the normal behavior in the plant or
its instruments. A fault detection system is making a binary decision that indicates
the system is working in normal (healthy) condition or something is going wrong with
the monitored system. Fault isolation is determination of the location of a fault in the
monitored system and fault identification determine and identify type of the fault in
a monitored system. A system with detection, isolation and identification capabilities
is known as Fault Detection, Isolation and Identification (FDII) system.
FDII systems for attitude control subsystems of spacecraft have been developed
in the past decade. There are different approaches that have been developed in the
literatures on FDII systems for faulty components such as sensors, actuators and
controllers ([25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32]).
However, majority of these works have been developed on a single spacecraft and
there is not as much as works on FDII for formation flying spacecraft in literatures.
Since there are complexities that are involved with formation flying missions, there
is an important area of research regarding the FDII in spacecraft formation flying.
In this thesis, FDII problem in spacecraft formation flying is considered in two
levels, spacecraft-level and formation-level fault diagnosis. In spacecraft-level fault
diagnosis, FDII is related to subsystem component fault diagnosis. Typically, subsys-
tem components are the sensors and actuators within the subsystems. For instance,
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in the case of attitude control subsystem, reaction wheels, thrusters, and attitude
sensors are the components. Our proposed spacecraft-level FDII, detects faults in
the reaction wheel actuator in a satellite and isolate the faulty reaction wheel in a
satellite and also identifies th type of faults in the reaction wheel.
The formation-level FDII is unique to multi-platform missions. Individual space-
craft in the formation are considered as different "components" of the formation
flying system. Therefore, at this level, fault detection is essentially the binary de-
cision making about whether or not any fault exist in the formation components,
i.e., in one or more satellites in the formation. Consequently, the objective of fault
isolation, in this level, is to identify particular spacecraft that are faulty. In our pro-
posed formation-level fault diagnosis, fault in the formation platform will be detected
and faulty satellite will be isolated, then the faulty reaction wheel in that satellite is
isolated and the type of fault in the reaction wheel will be identified as well.
In our proposed spacecraft-level FDII scheme, the absolute attitude measurements
in each satellite are considered as diagnostic signals. We will show that spacecraft-
level FDII can only detect and isolate high severity faults in the reaction wheel and
low severity faults can not detect in this FDII scheme. Hence, we will propose the
formation-level FDII scheme. In this scheme, the relative attitude measurements in
one satellite with respect to each of its neighbors in a formation are considered as
diagnostic signals. We will show that this FDII scheme can detect and isolate both
high severity and low severity faults in the reaction wheel actuator in a satellite.
There are different types of sensors and actuators that are utilized in the spacecraft
that depend on the mission objectives. For attitude maneuvers, magnetic torque,
reaction wheel and thrusters are actuators that are utilized in spacecraft for attitude
maneuvers.
Reaction wheel is the most commonly used actuator in spacecraft. It is a pre-
cise and reliable actuator. There are different approaches that are proposed in fault
detection and isolation for reaction wheel actuators in single spacecraft but the de-
velopment of an FDII system for detecting and isolating faults in reaction wheel of
spacecraft especially in formation of flying spacecraft is still a challenging problem.
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The desired FDII in formation flying spacecraft must have the capability of detecting
the faults in formation and isolating the faulty satellite and also identifying the type
of faults in the reaction wheels within a proper constraint.
1.2 Literature Review
Research into formation flying of satellites has gained in popularity during the 1990’s
and over the past decade and during these years numerous formation flying missions
have been conceived. Two such missions are ESA’s CLUSTER mission [97] and the
ESA/NASA GRACE mission [98].
CLUSTER comprises of four identical spacecraft launched into large, highly el-
liptical polar orbits around the Earth. These satellites fly in pre-determined relative
orbits designed so as to allow scientists to measure subtle changes in the interaction
between the Earth and the Sun. The CLUSTER satellites were launched in August
2000 for nine years and its mission is extended until 31 December 2014 [97,95].
Another mission that implements a formation flying technology is the GRACE
mission. The GRACE mission features two identical satellites in a leader-follower
formation (GRACE A and GRACE B) orbiting the Earth on the same orbital plane.
The purpose of this mission is to generate high-fidelity modeling of Earth’s gravita-
tional field. A secondary experiment that GRACE performs is examining how the
atmosphere affects GPS signals. The initial altitude of GRACE A and GRACE B
above the Earth was close to 500 km. Due to atmospheric drag, it will decrease to
about 300 km towards the end of the mission. It is originally funded for a five-year
period (2002 to 2007) however the mission was been further extended to 2009. As
the orbit decay has been slower than initially thought and the satellite’s current fuel
supply is expected to last another few years at the very least, the mission is likely to
continue until 2015 [98,95].
Another two ESA formation flying missions are PRISMA [99] and PROBA-3 [100].
PRISMA is a Swedish-led satellite project with the objective to develop and qualify
new technology necessary for future formation flying science missions. PRISMA con-
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sists of two spacecraft, with a total mass of about 200 kg. It contains several new
technologies within autonomous formation flying and rendezvous, small rocket en-
gines and Micro Electro Mechanical Systems (MEMS). The PRISMA satellites were
launched from Dnepr-1, Russia, on 15 June 2010 [95]. PROBA-3 [100] is the ESA
formation flying mission that is scheduled to be launched in 2017 for future forma-
tion flying missions. The PROBA-3 mission will demonstrate algorithms, sensors,
propulsion systems and other technologies needed for formation flying.
An important joint NASA/ESA mission, implementing a number of critical for-
mation flying technologies is the Laser Interferometer Space Antenna (LISA) [101].
LISA is designed to detect "ripples" in space-time, as predicted by Einstein’s general
theory of relativity. LISA’s three spacecraft will form an equilateral triangle with an
arm length of about 5 million km. Each spacecraft houses two free floating cubes
made of a gold-platinum alloy inside the spacecraft, shielded from adverse effects of
being in interplanetary space. The distance between the cubes in different spacecraft
is monitored using highly accurate laser-based techniques [101,95].
NASA has proposed many formation flying missions. Some of these missions
are currently under development, while others are in conceptual stages. One of
NASA’s main formation flying missions is the Magnetospheric Multiscale Mission
(MMS) [102]. MMS includes four identical spacecraft in a variably spaced tetrahe-
dron with a planned two-year mission lifetime. The system includes inter-spacecraft
ranging, communication and instrumentation, designed to measure magnetic and elec-
tric fields using electron and ion plasma spectrometers, providing high temporal and
spatial resolution. MMS is currently in the preliminary design stage and its launch
is planned for 2014.
The NASA’s future formation flying missions are the Stellar Imager (SI) [103] and
Milli-Arc-Second Structure Imager (MASSIM) [104] that all planned for the third
decade of the 21st century. The SI mission is a space-based ultraviolet (UV)/optical
interferometer with over 200 times the resolution of the Hubble space telescope. The
proposed MASSIM mission will image in X-rays the structure of astrophysical objects
with an angular resolution three orders of magnitude better than the present state of
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the art. An optics spacecraft carrying an array of diffractive/refractive lenses focuses
X-rays onto detectors on a spacecraft 1000 km behind.
1.3 Objective of the Thesis
The main objective of this thesis is to propose a fault detection, isolation and identi-
fication (FDII) scheme for attitude control subsystem of formation flying of satellites.
In this scheme, the reaction wheel is chosen as an actuator in order to verify the FDII
scheme in formation flying missions. In order to fulfill this objective, the dynamics
of actuator are presented and the formation flying control architectures are provided
and described in detail. Different fault scenarios in the reaction wheel actuators are
described and considered in this research. A hierarchical level FDII scheme based on
discrete wavelet transform and neural networks are proposed in this thesis that con-
sist of the spacecraft-level FDII scheme and the formation-level FDII scheme. These
two approaches are developed, described and evaluated for formation flying satellites
and extensive simulation results are also provided as well.
1.4 Contributions of the Thesis
The main contributions of this thesis are described as follows:
• A novel fault detection, isolation and identification scheme for a reaction wheel
that is used as an actuator in the attitude control subsystem of satellite is
proposed by employing wavelet entropy and neural networks. The proposed
scheme is capable of successfully detecting, isolating and identifying three classes
of commonly occurring faults in reaction wheel actuators.
• The results that are obtained through simulations indicate that formation flying
fault analysis scheme can detect, isolate and identify both low severity and high
severity faults in the reaction wheels however, single satellite fault diagnosis
scheme can only detect and isolate high severity faults in the reaction wheels.
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Hence, by employing formation-level fault diagnosis scheme, the accuracy and
precision of the fault analysis in formation flying of satellites is shown to be
improved.
• The results obtained through a large number of simulation scenarios demon-
strate a high level of accuracy and precision and classification accuracy. The
capability of the wavelet entropy and neural networks schemes in the fault di-
agnosis problem was successfully demonstrated.
There are several advantages to using spacecraft formation flying such as increased
reliability, accuracy, robustness, flexibility, cost energy efficiency and probability of
success. The proposed scheme for fault detection and isolation is capable of detecting
and isolating the faults autonomously and reducing significant amount of hours that
could have otherwise be spend by the ground station personal in order to analysis
the faults. The reliability and performance of the formation flying mission can also
be significantly improved.
1.5 Outline of the Thesis
The organization of this thesis is described as follows:
• In Chapter 2, the fault detection and isolation problems are presented and two
main categories of fault analysis methods are discussed. Furthermore, different
approaches in the literatures for FDII in satellites are presented.
• In Chapter 3, the concept of coordinate systems and different attitude represen-
tations are provided and, then the concept of spacecraft dynamics and formation
flying of spacecraft control architectures are explained. Furthermore, in this
chapter different types of sensors and actuators that are utilized in the space-
craft are described and the mathematical model of the reaction wheel actuator
is explained and finally, the mathematical models for the attitude disturbances
in the satellites are provided.
7
• In Chapter 4, the wavelet-entropy fault detection scheme for single spacecraft
is proposed and developed. In this scheme the absolute attitude measurements
in the satellite are considered for fault diagnosis and different fault scenarios in
the reaction wheel actuators are explained and considered. The fault isolation
scheme based on relative wavelet energy is proposed and the fault identification
scheme based on discrete wavelet transform and neural networks for a single
satellite are developed and the metrics of accuracy and precision (from the
confusion matrix) are provided for the FDII scheme.
• In Chapter 5, the FDII scheme in the formation flying is proposed and devel-
oped. In this scheme the relative attitude measurements are considered for fault
diagnosis purposes. In order to evaluate this scheme in the formation flying, the
fault scenarios in the reaction wheels that are considered in Chapter 4 are simu-
lated and the accuracy and the precision of the proposed fault detection scheme
are evaluated and compared to the proposed FDII scheme in a single space-
craft that is explained in Chapter 4. Then, the fault isolation and identification
schemes for the formation flying are developed and evaluated.
• In Chapter 6, conclusions and the main contributions of this research are de-
scribed and possible future work based on these contributions are provided.
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Chapter 2
Fault Detection and Isolation
Problem
There is an increasing demand for modern control systems such as autonomous space-
craft to operate autonomously in the presence of faults and failures in sensors, ac-
tuators, and components. This requires a fault diagnosis system that is capable of
detecting plant, actuator and sensor faults when they occur and isolating the faulty
component. The main tasks of fault diagnosis are to detect and isolate occurring
faults in order to avoid overall failure of the monitored system. Fault diagnosis is an
essential component of an autonomous system. Hence, a high demand exists for the
development of intelligent systems that are able to autonomously detect the presence
and isolate the location of faults occurring in different components of complex dynam-
ical systems. Especially faults in a control loop are of particular importance as they
may instantly result in instability of the controlled system. Thus, it is crucial that
faults are efficiently and timely detected and isolated while the system is in operation.
2.1 Classification of Fault Diagnosis Systems
The fault diagnosis (that is fault detection, isolation and identification) techniques in
the literature can be divided into model-based and history-based categories [59]. The
model-based can be broadly classified as qualitative or quantitative. The model is
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Figure 2.1: Classification of fault diagnosis systems [59].
usually developed based on some fundamental understanding of the physics of the pro-
cess. In quantitative models this understanding is expressed in terms of mathematical
functional relationships between the inputs and outputs of the system. However, in
qualitative model these relationships are expressed in terms of qualitative functions
centered on different units in a process. In process history based methods only the
availability of large amount of historical process data is assumed. There are different
ways to transform and present these to a diagnostic system. This is known as the
feature extraction process from the process history data, and is done to facilitate
subsequent diagnosis. This extraction process can mainly proceed as either quanti-
tative or qualitative feature extractions. In quantitative feature extraction one can
perform either a statistical or a non-statistical feature extraction. The classification
of diagnostic systems is shown in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.2: Hardware and analytical redundancy schemes [117].
2.1.1 Model-Based Fault Diagnosis
A traditional approach to fault diagnosis is based on the hardware redundancy method
which uses multiple sensors, actuators, computers and software to measure or control
a particular system [33]. The major problems encountered with hardware redundancy
are the extra equipment, maintenance cost and the additional space required to ac-
commodate the redundant components. An alternative approach for fault diagnosis
is based on analytical redundancy which uses the redundant analytical relationships
among system inputs and measured system outputs to generate residual signals where
no extra hardware is required in this approach. In analytical redundancy schemes, the
resulting difference that is generated from consistency checks of different variables is
called a residual signal. Analytical redundancy schemes make use of a mathematical
model of the monitored system and is often referred to as the model-based approach
to fault diagnosis. Figure 2.2 illustrates the concepts of hardware and analytical
redundancy [33]. The principle of model based fault detection and isolation is de-
picted in Figure 2.3. As mentioned before, model based fault diagnosis is divided into
two categories, quantitative approaches and qualitative approaches. The quantitative
model-based method utilizes a mathematical model. The techniques commonly used
are based on observer approach, parameter estimation, parity space, and combination
of the first three [49,50,51].
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Figure 2.3: Model based fault detection and isolation approach [117].
In observer or state estimation approaches, two observer methods are used to
estimate the outputs of the system Luenberger observers in the deterministic setting
[34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41] or Kalman filters in a stochastic setting [42,43,44]. The
popularity of state-space models as well as the wide usage of observers in modern
control theory and applications has made the observer based fault diagnosis approach
as one of the most common approaches in this domain. In parity space approach,
the system input and output data checks over a given time window and the residual
signals (or parity vectors) are generated [45,46,47,48]. The Parameter estimation
method [52,53] is based on system identification techniques. This method is based on
the concept that faults typically affect the physical coefficients of the process such as
friction, mass, viscosity, resistance, etc. In this approach the parameters of the actual
process are estimated on-line and the results are compared with the parameters of
the reference model that is obtained under the healthy condition.
In recent years, fault diagnosis schemes for nonlinear systems have been widely
investigated. Most techniques in the literature utilize the extension of the meth-
ods that are described above for linear systems. Many nonlinear observer schemes
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were proposed and developed in the literature for solving the nonlinear system fault
diagnosis problem [54,55,56,57,58].
As mentioned before, in quantitative model-based methods, the understanding
of model is expressed in terms of mathematical functional relationships between the
inputs and outputs of the system. In contrast, in qualitative models the relationships
among system variables and parameters are used to describe the system behavior
in qualitative terms such as causalities and IF-THEN rules. The qualitative model
can be developed either as qualitative casual models or abstraction hierarchies. The
knowledge in the casual models can be represented qualitatively in various forms,
such as digraphs, fault trees or qualitative physics [60].
2.1.2 History-Based Fault Diagnosis
Model-based fault diagnosis approaches rely on the key assumption that a perfectly
accurate and complete mathematical model of the system under supervision is avail-
able. However, such an assumption may not always be valid in practice. This problem
has contributed to the development of history-based FDII methods. Fuzzy logic, neu-
ral networks and wavelet transform are three history-based approaches that have been
utilized in literature for fault diagnosis schemes.
These approaches become increasingly more appealing for situations where high-
fidelity mathematical model of the monitored system does not exist or is extremely
difficult to obtain. The main challenge though is to ensure that sufficient amount of
data from the healthy operational mode of the system is available. Fuzzy logic is now
being investigated as powerful modeling and decision making tool for nonlinear fault
diagnosis systems [61]. Fuzzy logic method for fault diagnosis problem belongs to the
sub-class of rule-based expert systems and it can express expert knowledge in terms
of natural language statements. It has the potential to formulate the qualitative
relationships among the model variables of the process being monitored using IF-
THEN rules.
Fuzzy sets perform a smooth interface between the qualitative variables involved
in the rules and the numerical data at the inputs and outputs of the model. The
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appealing feature of fuzzy logic is that its ability to deal with imprecise facts or noisy
data, and is therefore suited for application where complete information about fault
and system is not available to the fault diagnosis designer [62,63]. Whenever expert
knowledge is not available and the fuzzy rules are obtained using qualitative physics,
neural networks are profoundly used for learning (or determining) the parameters of
those rules from historical input−output data of the system, hence the name neuro-
fuzzy systems [63,64].
As mentioned above, neural networks are among the most widely used intelligent
techniques for fault diagnosis. This is mainly due to their distinguished ability to
approximate, to an arbitrary level of accuracy, any continuous nonlinear function,
given suitable network parameters (or weights), architecture, and learning algorithm
[65,66]. Indeed, neural networks are able to learn nonlinear functions from examples.
They have the ability to make intelligent decisions even in cases where system data are
corrupted with noise. They also have a highly parallel structure, which is expected to
achieve a higher degree of fault-tolerance than conventional function approximation
schemes and, last but not the least, they are readily applicable to multi-variable
systems. Neural networks can also be applied to process health monitoring, where
the focus is on identification of small irreversible changes in the process that may
develop into bigger faults [67,68,69,70,71].
The capability of wavelet in feature extraction of diagnosis signals in time and
frequency domain, leads to utilize this method in fault diagnosis schemes. Wavelet
decomposition has the property of well-localized in time and frequency domain and
time-frequency window can be adjusted with the practical signals. Furthermore,
wavelet-entropy represents the degree of chaos of the measured signal which can
provide useful information about the faults in the system. Many approaches have
been developed in the literature based on wavelet decomposition for fault diagnosis
of nonlinear systems [72,73,74,75,76,77,78].
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2.1.3 Hybrid Methods
One of the important points in fault diagnosis schemes is that no single method is
adequate to handle all the requirements for a diagnostic system. Though all the
methods are restricted, in the sense that they are only as good as the quality of infor-
mation provided, it was shown that some methods might better suit the knowledge
available than others. Some of these methods can complement one another resulting
in better diagnostic systems. Integrating these complementary features is one way
to develop hybrid methods that could overcome the limitations of individual solution
strategies. Hence, hybrid approaches where different methods work in conjunction
with one other to solve parts of the problem are attractive.
Wavelet decomposition has strong capability in dealing with signals in time and
frequency domains and can detect anomalies in signals and neural networks is a strong
nonlinear classifier and it has a strong capability in pattern recognition and pattern
classification. Hence, combining these two methods gives us a strong fault detection
and isolation scheme for nonlinear systems [72,73,74,76].
2.2 Desired Characteristics of Fault Diagnosis Sys-
tems
In order to compare various diagnostic approaches, it is useful to identify a set of
desirable characteristics that a diagnostic system should possess. According to [59]
the ideal fault detection and isolation (FDI) system must have the following charac-
teristics:
• Quick detection, isolation and identification
Quickness is a critical factor for fault diagnosis systems. The diagnosis system




Isolability is the ability of the diagnostic system in classification of different
faults in system. This ability depends to a great extend on the monitored
system characteristics.
• Robustness
Robustness with respect to noise, disturbances, uncertainties and unmodeled
dynamics is a desirable feature in fault diagnosis systems.
• Novelty identifiability
The FDI system must be able to decide if the monitored system works in normal
or abnormal condition and if abnormal, whether the cause is a known fault or
unknown fault.
• Classification error estimate
The FDI system must provide the classification error in monitored system. Such
error is useful to give the level of reliability of the FDI system.
• Adaptability
The monitored system may change due to structural changes or disturbances
and also changing in environmental condition. Thus the diagnostic system must
be adaptable to these changes.
• Explanation facility
The diagnostic system must also provide the explanation on the origination of
the faults in monitored system. This requires the reasoning ability on causes
and effects relationships in a system.
• Modeling requirements
For development of diagnosis classifier to perform in real-time the modeling
effort must be as minimal as possible.
• Storage and computational requirements
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The fault diagnosis system must implement algorithms that are computationally
not too complex and have high capability of storing relevant information.
• Multiple fault identifiability
The ability of detecting and isolating multiple faults is an important and also
difficult task in diagnostic systems.
2.3 Previous Work on Fault Diagnosis of Attitude
Control Subsystem (ACS) of Spacecraft
In recent years, there has been a special interest in developing autonomous fault diag-
nostic approaches for actuators of the attitude control subsystem (ACS) of spacecraft.
As mentioned previously, the research is focused on two major approaches, model
based and history based methods.
Reference [31] proposed a reliable failure classification system based on the fault-
tree method. This methods was tested with data extracted from a reaction wheel
actuator of a simulated attitude control subsystem of a satellite.
In [85], a neural network observer-based scheme for the actuator fault detection
and isolation in the spacecraft attitude control subsystem is presented. This FDI
system consists of three Elman recurrent neural networks and each of them is specific
for modeling the dynamics of the wheel on each axis separately and independently.
In [86], an actuator fault detection and isolation system for the ACS of a satellite
is proposed. This FDI system uses a recurrent adaptive time delay neural network
and has robustness and insensitivity characteristics due to the external disturbances
and noise.
In [26], a dynamic neural network residual generator based on the dynamic mul-
tilayer perceptron network (DMLP) is proposed. The developed neural observer is
applied to the reaction wheel model and the results are compared to the linear model-
based observer acting as a residual generator. Also, adaptive neural network classifier
based on learning vector quantization (LVQ) network is proposed in order to isolate
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the faults.
In [32], fault detection and isolation systems based on dynamic neural networks
for the pulsed plasma thrusters (PPTs) that are used in the ACS of a satellite in a
formation flying are proposed. In this work, three FDI schemes are developed: "low-
level" FDI, "high-level" FDI and "integrated" FDI. The low-level scheme utilizes the
absolute measurements from the actuator and the high-level used relative attitude
measurements in a satellite and the integrated scheme utilizes both previous schemes
in order to improve the results.
Reference [84] deals with the real-time fault diagnosis in the ACS of a satellite
based on sliding-window wavelet and dynamic recurrent neural networks. In this work,
the sliding-window technique is utilized in order to detect anomalies in reaction wheel
actuator and the dynamic recurrent neural network is used to isolate the faults in a
reaction wheel.
In [108] a hierarchical fault detection, isolation and recovery approach is developed
for avionics and spacecraft applications. Fault-three synthesis and neural networks are
utilized in [109] to develop a fault diagnosis approach for the RADARSAT-1 ACS.
Reference [110] provides a fault detection, isolation and recovery approach for the
ACS of the ESA GOCE satellite and references [111,112,113,114,115] deal with the
integration, reutilization, and standardization of FDI systems used in previous mis-
sions planned by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and European Space Agency
(ESA).
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter the concepts of fault detection, isolation and identification (FDII)
have been provided and the characteristics of the desired FDII system are provided.
The FDII approaches are divided into two main categories; model based methods
and history based methods. The advantages and disadvantages for each group have
been discussed and compared. The previous works for FDII in spacecraft have been





Formation Flying of Satellites
The NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) proposed the definition of space-
craft formation flying as follows [95]:
"The tracking or maintenance of a desired relative separation, orientation or po-
sition between or among spacecraft."
Hence, formation flying spacecraft is a particular case of a more general cate-
gory. There are several advantages to utilize formation of multiple spacecraft. These
includes robustness, accuracy, feasibility cost and energy efficiency. This chapter pro-
vides an overview on the fundamentals of formation flying control architectures and
defines the formation flying attitude control subsystem that is used to evaluate fault
diagnosis systems and also different sensors and actuators that are used in space-
craft. Section 3.1 introduces the concept of coordinate reference frames, Section 3.2
describes rotational matrix for coordinate frames transformation, in Section 3.3 dif-
ferent attitude presentations are described and in Section 3.4 the formation flying
of multiple spacecraft is discussed. In Section 3.5 the spacecraft sensors and actu-
ators are presented, while Section 3.6 discusses mathematical modeling of reaction
wheel actuators in spacecraft and finally, the mathematical modeling of the external
attitude disturbances are described in Section 3.7.
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3.1 Coordinate Reference Frame
In spaceflight analysis in order to know the position and motion of a satellite, one
must first select the correct coordinate system for the problem. A description of
the three main coordinate systems used in formation flying calculations is presented
below [88]. The representation of the satellite’s position and attitude is dependent
on these reference frames. Hence, the definitions of these reference frames, and how
to rotate vectors between them, are crucial for satellite formation flying studies.
3.1.1 Earth Centered Inertial (ECI) Frame
Figure 3.1: Earth-Center inertial frame, Fi [118].
This frame is fixed in space, which means that it is a non-accelerated reference
frame in which Newton’s Laws are valid. The origin of the frame is oriented at the
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center of Earth. The x axis points in the direction of the vernal equinox, z-axis points
toward the North Pole and y-axis completes the right hand Cartesian coordinate
system. This frame is denoted by Fi. Figure 3.1 illustrates the axes of the ECI frame
in space.
3.1.2 Body Frame
This frame is a moving reference frame which is fixed on the satellite. The orientation
of the satellite is determined relative to the Orbit frame, while angular velocities are
expressed in the Body frame. The origin of this frame is the center of mass of the
satellite body, the x-axis forward and z-axis is downward, y-axis completes the right
hand orthogonal system. The origin is at the center of the mass of the satellite. This
frame is denoted by Fb.
3.1.3 Orbital Frame
Figure 3.2: Satellite orbital and body frame.
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Orbit frame rotates relative to the inertial frame, with a rate of depending on the
altitude of the satellite. The origin is at the center of mass of the satellite. The y-axis
is in the orbit anti-normal direction. The z-axis points toward the center of Earth,
and the x-axis completes the right hand system. Figure 3.2 illustrates the orbital
frame and body frame of a satellite. This frame is denoted by FO.
3.2 Rotational Matrix
Rotation matrix is a description of the rotational relationship between two reference
frames. The rotation matrix C from frame m to n is denoted ba Cnm. Rotation of a
vector from frame m to frame n, can be given as
vm = Cnmv
n (3.1)
The orientation of the satellite is described using a rotation matrix (direction cosine







In this matrix each of the elements mij is named directional cosines and column

















Rotation matrix is an orthogonal matrix, thus m1, m2 and m3 are orthogonal. The









A = I3×3 (3.4)
3.3 Attitude Representation
There are many ways to represent the attitude of a satellite in a reference frame. But
frequently Euler angles and Unit Quaternions are the two mostly used for present-
ing a satellite orientation. Euler angles are reliable, simple and accurate enough for
applications, however sometimes singularities occur in coordinate transformations.
In order to avoid singularities, Quaternion representation can be used as represen-
tation method as described below. In our simulation we have used unit quaternions
representation.
3.3.1 Euler Angles Representation
The Euler angles representation is often used in a user’s interface during attitude
computation because of its clear physical interpretation. Its parameters consist of
three rotation angles known as the roll angle φ, pitch angle θ and yaw angle ψ.
The angles roll, pitch and yaw represent the rotations about the x, y and z axis,
respectively in a rotation from one frame to another. These angles are illustrated in
Figure 3.3. The tranformation of a vector in an initial reference frame (xi, yi, zi) to a




























Unit quaternions are the other way for the attitude representation. They were first de-
scribed by the Irish mathematician Sir William Rowan Hamilton in 1843 and applied
to mechanics in three-dimensional space. Unit quaternions has several advantages
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Figure 3.3: Euler angles in satellite [119].
over the Euler angles. Quaternions involve the use of algebraic relations to determine
the elements of the rotation matrix. The computations are faster and there are no
singularities as may occur on the Euler angle formulation. The disadvantage is that
there is no obvious physical interpretation of the rotation geometry.
Quaternion has 4 elements. Three of the elements are vectors which define an axis
of rotation and the fourth element is a scaler that defines the magnitude of a rotation
angle about the axis of rotation. A quaternion can be represented as:
Q =~iq1 +~jq2 + ~kq3 + q4 (3.6)














where m1,m2,m3 are the rotation axis and µ is the rotation angle. The unit quater-
nion satisfy qT q = 1 which also means that q21 + q22 + q23 + q24 = 1. The rotation matrix
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from Body frame to the orbital frame can be expressed in quaternions as:
COB =

1− 2(q23 + q24) 2(q2q3 − q4q1) 2(q2q4 + q3q1)
2(q2q3 + q4q1) 1− 2(q22 + q24) 2(q3q4 − q2q1)
2(q2q4 − q3q1) 2(q3q4 + q2q1) 1− 2(q22 + q23)
 (3.8)
3.3.3 Satellite Attitude Dynamics
The satellite is modeled as a rigid body and its dynamic model is derived using the
Euler’s dynamical equation [89,90]. Euler’s dynamical equation is the equivalent of




where ~h = I.~ω is the angular momentum, and τ is the sum of all external torques
acting on the body.
Equation (3.9) is expressed with respect to the inertial reference frame. With
respect to the body reference frame with an angular velocity ~ω, Euler’s equation
becomes
~˙h+ ~ω × ~h = ~τ (3.10)
The scaler form of this equation becomes
h˙x + ωyhz − ωzhy = τx
h˙y + ωzhx − ωxhz = τy
h˙z + ωxhy − ωyhx = τz (3.11)
where hx, hy, hz are the angular momentum components along the body coordinates
and ωx, ωy, ωz are the angular velocity components about the body axes and τx, τy, τz
are the body referenced external torques.
If we assume that the spacecraft body frame is aligned with the principal axes,
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then we can have
hx = Ixωx
hy = Iyωy
hz = Izωz (3.12)
so that equation (3.11) becomes
Ixω˙x − ωyωz(Iy − Iz) = τx
Iyω˙y − ωxωz(Iz − Ix) = τy
Izω˙z − ωyωz(Ix − Iy) = τz (3.13)
where Ix, Iy, Iz are the principal moments of inertia of the body. Equation (3.13)
describes the attitude dynamics of a rigid body satellite.
3.4 Formation Flying of Multiple Spacecraft
A spacecraft formation consists of two or more spacecraft in specific relative positions
and orientations. Dispersing the functions of a single spacecraft over a formation of
smaller spacecraft produces robust and fault-tolerant system architecture and reduces
the costs of the mission. A formation of small satellites would be cheaper to develop
and launch, but could still perform the tasks of a large, single satellite mission through
proper task distribution. The failure of a single spacecraft in a formation does not
necessarily lead to system failure as it would in a single, larger spacecraft. Upgrades
or repairs could be performed by simply replacing any obsolete or disabled spacecraft.
Finally, the capability of obtaining multiple simultaneous measurements along a large
baseline would enable satellite formations to accomplish goals that are difficult or
impossible to achieve with a single satellite. Three main architectures for formation
flying control are proposed in literature which can be defined as follows [95,96]:
• Leader-follower structure
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In the leader-follower strategy, one typically divides the spacecraft into sub-
groups. Within each subgroup one spacecraft is defined as the leader and the
rest are defined as followers. Leader spacecraft is controlled to a reference orbit
and the other follower spacecraft in the formation control their relative states
to that leader. This approach has the advantage that it allows most satellites
in the formation to follow the natural dynamics of the absolute orbit of the
leader, while only performing regular automatic control on the relative states of
the formation. The principal disadvantage of leader-follower is that the leader
spacecraft is by definition at its correct state and will not require as much fuel
use as the followers. Fuel use can be balanced among the satellites by periodi-
cally interchanging the designations of the leader and followers.
• Behavioral structure
In the behavioral strategy, the control action for each spacecraft is defined
by a weighted average of the controls corresponding to each desired behavior
for the spacecraft. This approach eases the implementation of conflicting or
competing control objectives, such as tracking versus avoidance. It is however
difficult to enforce group behavior, and to mathematically guarantee stability
and formation convergence.
• Virtual structure
In the third approach, virtual structure, the spacecraft formation is viewed as
a virtual rigid body. The desired states of a single spacecraft, may be specified
such that the formation moves as a single structure. In this scheme it is easy to
prescribe a coordinated group behavior and the formation may be maintained
well during maneuvers, given that the single spacecraft is able to follow its
trajectory and the chief advantage of this approach over the leader/follower
method is that state error will pertain to all the spacecraft in the formation.
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3.5 Formation Flying Missions
3.5.1 Formation Flying Architecture Control Design
In our simulations, in order to simulate the flying of formation spacecraft, a decentral-
ized architecture is developed to control the formation spacecraft via virtual structure
[91]. In this thesis, four coordinate reference frames are used for formation flying of
spacecraft. The inertial frame Fi, the formation frame FF which is fixed at the vir-
tual center of the formation, body frame Fb and reference frame F db which denotes
the desired configuration for each spacecraft. As described previously, in the virtual
structure approach, the entire desired formation is treated as a single structure with
a formation frame located at its virtual center of mass to represent its configuration.
The virtual structure has attitude qF and angular velocity ωF relative to inertial
frame. Let qi and ωi represent the attitude and angular velocity of the i-th spacecraft
relative to the inertial frame. Similarly, let qiF and ωiF represent attitude and angular
velocity of the i-th spacecraft relative to formation frame. The actual states of the ith
place holder represent the desired states of the ith spacecraft, hence these states are
denoted by qdiF and ωdiF . Generally qdiF and ωdiF can vary with time, that means the
formation shape is time-varying, however, in our simulations, we are concerned that
formation maneuvers must preserve the overall formation shape, i.e, each spacecraft
needs to preserve a fixed relative position and orientation in the virtual structure,
hence, qdiF should be constant, and ωdiF should be zero. The state of the virtual
structure is defined as




If each spacecraft has knowledge of ξ and of its own desired position and orientation
with respect to the virtual structure, then formation keeping is transformed into an
individual tracking problem. Therefore, the vector ξ represents the minimum amount
of information needed by each spacecraft to coordinate its motion with the group.
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Given qF and ωF , the desired states for the i-th spacecraft are given by:
[qdi ]o = [qF ]o[q
d
iF ]F (3.15)
[ωdi ]o = [ωF ]o (3.16)
3.5.2 Decentralized Architecture
In the decentralized architecture, each spacecraft in the formation instantiates a local
copy of the coordination variable ξi = [qTFi, ωTFi]. The ξi represents the coordination
variable instantiated in the ith spacecraft corresponding to the coordination variable
ξ defined in equation (3.14).
Figure 3.4: Decentralized architecture via the virtual structure approach [91].
A bidirectional ring topology is used to communicate the coordination variable
instantiations, to bring each local instantiation into consensus. The decentralized ar-
chitecture via virtual structure approach is illustrated in Fig 3.4. In this figure, block
Gi is a discrete event supervisor for the i-th spacecraft, block Fi is the formation con-
trol module, which produces and broadcasts coordination variable, System Ki is the
local spacecraft controller for the i-th spacecraft, and Si represents the i-th spacecraft.
When the formation maneuver starts, each discrete event supervisor Gi outputs the
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current formation pattern to the formation control module Fi. Each formation con-
trol module implements a coordination variable instantiation ξi. Formation control
module Fi then sends its coordination variable instantiation ξi to the local spacecraft
controller Ki. Based on ξi the local controller Ki derives the desired states for the
i-th spacecraft.
3.5.3 Formation Control Strategy
Two major tasks need to be carried out in the decentralized formation control via the
virtual structure approach [95]:
• Propose suitable control law for each spacecraft
• Control each virtual structure instantiation into consensus.
Formation Control Strategy for Each Spacecraft






ωi × Ji(ωi + ωdi )− kqiq̂di qi −Kωi(ωi − ωdi ) (3.17)
where kqi is a positive scalar, Kwi is a symmetrical positive-definite matrix, and q̂di qi
is the vector part of the unit quaternion qd∗i qi and q∗ is the conjugate of a quaternion
q.
Formation Control Strategy for Each Virtual Structure
The error state for the ith coordination variable instantiation is defined as
ξ˜i = ξi − ξd = [q˜TFi, ω˜TFi]T (3.18)
where ξd represents a desired formation pattern to be achieved. There are two objec-
tives for the coordination variable implemented in each spacecraft.
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The first objective is to reach its desired constant goal σd defined by the forma-
tion pattern set and the second objective is to drive each instantiation to consensus,





∥∥∥ξi − ξd∥∥∥2 (3.19)





‖ξi − ξi+1‖2 (3.20)
where ξn+1 = ξ1 and ξ0 = ξn. Defining E(t) = EG(t) + ES(t), then the control
objective is to drive E(t) to zero asymptotically.
The proposed control torque τFi is given as [95]:
τFi = kG
̂qd∗F qFi − kS ̂qd∗F (i+1)qFi −DS(ωFi − ωF (i+1))− kS ̂qd∗F (i−1)qFi −DS(ωFi − ωF (i−1))
(3.21)
where KG > 0 and KS ≥ 0 are scalars, DS is symmetrical positive-semidefinite matrix
and q̂ represents the vector part of the unit quaternion.
3.6 Attitude Sensors and Actuators
Attitude determination is the process of determining the orientation and location of
the spacecraft relative to some reference frame. The most commonly used reference
vectors are the unit vectors directed toward the Sun, the center of the Earth, a known
star, or the magnetic field of the Earth. An attitude sensor measures the orientation
of a given reference vector relative to the spacecraft reference frame [90]. Sun sensors,
rate sensors, magnetometers and star cameras are among the various sensors that are
used in a satellite.
Star sensors are different types of sensors which can be used for the attitude
determination. The orientations of the spacecraft relative to the reference vectors
can be computed after the orientation of these vectors are determined relative to the
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spacecraft frame. The process of achieving and maintaining an orientation in space
is called attitude control. Spacecraft is reoriented from one attitude to another with
attitude maneuvering process.
After reorientation or an action that causes a change in attitude, the existing
attitude shall be maintained relative to some defined reference frame. This is defined
as attitude stabilization. Actuators are used for attitude control, stabilization or
maneuvering actions. They supply the desired control torques needed to perform
actions defined above. Different types of sensors and actuators are explained in the
sections given below [88,90].
3.6.1 Attitude Sensors
In this section, different types of sensors that are used in attitude determination are
explained [88,90].
Sun Sensors
Sun sensors are visible-light detectors which measure one or two angles between their
mounting base and incident sunlight. They are popular, simple, inexpensive, reliable
equipment with minimal power requirements but they require clear fields of view.
Star Sensors
Star sensors represent the most common sensors for high-accuracy missions. Star
sensors measure the star coordinates in the spacecraft frame and provide attitude
information when these observed coordinates are compared with known star directions
obtained from a star catalog. Star sensors are heavy, expensive, require more power,
and subject to interference from Sun, Earth, and other bright light sources. In spite
of these disadvantages, they are the most accurate means of attitude determination
with accuracies down to arc seconds.
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Horizon Sensors
The essential way for directly determining the relative attitude of a spacecraft with
respect to the Earth is to use horizon sensors. Horizon sensors are infrared devices that
detect the contrast between the cold of deep space and the heat of earth atmosphere.
Magnetometers
Magnetometers are sensors which measure the size and direction of the Earth’s mag-
netic field to determine the orientation of a spacecraft with respect to the local mag-
netic field. Magnetometers are widely used as attitude sensors since they are simple,
reliable, and lightweight and have low power requirements. But magnetometers are
not as accurate as star or horizon sensors. Due to a lack of complete knowledge of the
magnetic field model, the predicted direction and magnitude of the field at the space-
craft’s position are subject to errors. To improve the accuracy, their data usually are
combined with data from sun or horizon sensors.
GPS Receivers
GPS receivers are known as high-accuracy navigation devices and have been used for
attitude determination by employing the differential signals from separate antennas
on a spacecraft. These sensors are low cost and low weight and are being used in low
accuracy applications or as back-up sensors for low Earth orbit (LEO) missions.
Gyroscopes
Gyroscopes are inertial sensors which determine the attitude by measuring the speed
or angle of rotation of the spacecraft from initial reference without any knowledge
of an external or absolute reference. They are located internal to the spacecraft
and work at all points in an orbit. Since they measure a change instead of absolute




An actuator is the mechanism that supplies control torque or force for the attitude
control system. The most common sources of force/torque are gas thrusters, magne-
torquers and reaction wheels [88,90].
Magnetic Torquers
Magnetic torquers are used to generate magnetic dipole moment for attitude control.
They apply a torque on the satellite by producing a magnetic field which interacts
with the earth’s magnetic field.
Thrusters
All thrusters produce thrust by expelling propellant in the opposite direction. Gas
thrusters can be hot gas, when energy is derived from a chemical reaction or cold gas
type when energy is derived from the latent heat of a phase change. The obtained
torques or forces can be used to control attitude, spin rate, speed of momentum
wheels, and to adjust orbits. Gas jets or magnetic coils can be used for the same
purposes at low Earth orbits (LEO). The main limitation on the use of thrusters is
the required propellant supply. Fuel budget is an important part of mission planning
for any system using gas thrusters. Gas thrusters also have complex and expensive
plumbing systems.
Reaction Wheel
Reaction wheels use the rotational variant of Newton’s third law. When the motor
applies a torque to speed up or slow down the rotor, it produces a reacting torque
on the body of the satellite [90]. Since the satellite is essentially a closed system, the
total angular momentum of the satellite body plus the reaction wheels is constant.
Thus any change in the angular momentum of a reaction wheel results in an equal
and opposite change of the angular momentum of the satellite body. Reaction wheels
are effective active control elements. They are particularly good for variable spin
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rate control. Active control of spacecraft by using reaction wheels is a fast, flexible,
precise way of attitude control and stabilization. On the other hand, it requires
rapidly moving parts which implies problems of support and friction. Normally, three
reaction wheels are used to control a satellite, with the wheel axes aligned with the
body principal axes. In the next section the high fidelity mathematical model for
reaction wheel actuators, that are used in our simulations to generate data, will be
described.
3.7 Mathematical Model of Reaction Wheel Actua-
tors
A high-fidelity nonlinear model of a reaction wheel has been obtained from Bialke
[92] and has been integrated into the ACS dynamics. A block diagram representation
of this high-fidelity reaction wheel model is shown in Figure 3.5. The reaction wheels
considered in this thesis are ITHACO "type A" reaction wheels. The values of model
parameters for this type of wheel are also obtained from [92] and are given in Table
3.1. As Fig 3.5 illustrates, there are five main blocks in the reaction wheel model,
motor torque control, speed limiter, EMF torque limiting, motor disturbances and
bearing friction and disturbances.
Motor Torque Control Block
This block consists of voltage controlled current source with a gain, Gd. The result
is a motor current directly proportional to the torque command voltage. The motor
has a torque constant Kt which produces torque proportional to the current driven
Im into it. The torque command voltage is restricted to be within [-5,+5].
Speed Limiter Block
The function of a speed limier block is to prevent the reaction wheel from reaching
unsafe speeds. Once the wheel ω speed exceeds an establishes speed threshold ωs,
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Figure 3.5: Detailed reaction wheel block diagram [92].
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Table 3.1: Reaction wheel model constants [92].
Variable Nomenclature Unit Value
Gd Driver Gain A/V 0.19
Kt Motor Torque Constant N −m/A 0.029
Ke Motor Back-EMF V/rad/sec 0.029
Ks Overspeed Circuit Gain V/rad/sec 95
ωs Overspeed Circuit Threshold rad/sec 690
ωd Driver Bandwidth rad/sec 2000
τc Coulomb Fiction N −m 0.002
J Flywheel Inertia N −m− s2 0.0077
N Number of Motor Poles — 36
B Cogging Torque Amplitude N −m Zero
Rin Input Resistance Ω 2
Kf Voltage Feedback Gain V/V 0.5
Pq Quiescent Power W 3
ωa Torque Noise High Pass Filter
Frequency
rad/sec 0.2
θa Torque Noise Angle Deviation rad 0.05
Rb Bridge Resistance Ω 2
Torque command range V [−5,+5]
the circuit provides a high gain negative feedback Ks into the torque command. The
heavy-side function Hs utilize to enables the negative feedback.
EMF Torque Limiting Block
In the low bus voltage condition, when reaction wheel runs at high speed the back-
EMF of the motor is increased and the motor torque may be limited. This eventually
eliminates the voltage headroom and reduces torque capacity. From the disturbance
stand point, since the motor torque is coupled directly to the bus voltage any fluctua-
tions in the bus voltage will be felt as torque disturbances. The nonlinear relationship
between Ibus and Vbus is defined as
Ibus =
I2mRB + 0.04 |IM |Vbus + Pq + ωImke
Vbus − 1 (3.22)
In order to eliminate the voltage drop when power is not being drown from the bus
a heavy-side function HB is included in the block.
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Motor Disturbance Block
The motor torque in reaction wheel can be a source of very high frequency distur-
bances due to the motor excitation and the magnetic construction. Recent reaction
wheels include brushless DC motors that exhibit torque ripple at the commutation
frequency and cogging at a frequency corresponding to the number of motor poles
and rate of rotation. Torque ripple is defined as amount of variation in the motor
torque due to the commutation method and the shape of the back-EMF. The amount
of spacecraft disturbances due to torque ripple is highly dependent on the torque
ripple frequency. Cogging is a disturbance torque which is always present in a con-
ventional brushless DC motor. ITHACO’s zero cogging motor completely eliminates
this potential source of jitter.
Bearing Friction and Disturbances Block
The friction in a reaction wheel mathematically is divided into viscous friction and
coulomb friction. The viscous friction τv varies with speed and temperature and gen-
erated in the bearing due to the bearing lubricant. Since the viscosity is temperature
dependent the lubricant has a strong sensitivity to temperature. This drag torque for
ITHACO’s reaction wheel is defined as





The coulomb friction is constant with polarity dependent on the direction of rotation
of the reaction wheel. It is caused by rolling friction within the bearings. The loss in
torque is independent of wheel speed and temperature.
Torque Noise
Torque noise is the very low frequency torque variations from the bearings due to
lubricant dynamics. It is a function of lubricant behavior and it has the most signifi-
cant effect on the spacecraft pointing accuracy. This noise can be modeled as a sine
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3.8 Mathematical Model of External Attitude Dis-
turbances
The attitude control subsystem of an Earth-orbiting satellite must tolerate the typical
external disturbance torques due to the gravity-gradient effects, the Earth’s magnetic
field, aerodynamic torques (dominant in the low-altitude orbits), and solar radiation
torque. Therefore, all these environmental disturbances need to be modeled and
properly incorporated into the ACS simulator to be able to evaluate the robustness
of the proposed fault detection and isolation algorithms with respect to them. As
a result, the following mathematical models of these disturbances are obtained from
[88] and are incorporated into the ACS simulator.
3.8.1 Solar Radiation
Solar radiation pressure produces a force on the satellite related to its distance to the
sun. Solar radiation has more effect at high altitudes. Surface area of the satellite
which faces the Sun is essential when determining the resulting acceleration caused




As(1 + r).cosis.(cps − cg) (3.25)
where Fs is the solar constant, c is the speed of the light in m/s, As is the surface
area for solar radiation in m2, r is the coefficient of reflectivity, is is the sun incidence
angle, cps is the location of the center of solar pressure, and cg is the center of gravity.
Coefficient of reflectivity r is a number between 0 and 1 with usual value of 0.6 for




Any non-symmetrical object in the orbit is affected by a gravitational torque because
of the variation in the Earth’s gravitational force over the object. There are many
mathematical models for gravity gradient torque. The most common one is derived





where τg is the max gravity torque, µ is the Earth’s gravity constant in m
3
s2
, R is the
orbit radius in meter, θ is the maximum deviation of the z-axis from local vertical in
radians, Ix and Iy are moments of inertia about x and y axes in kg.m2.
3.8.3 Aerodynamic Drag
This disturbance is most effective on satellites orbiting below 400-500 km. The drag
force created by the air molecule interaction with satellite body produce a torque on
the satellite, thus reducing its velocity and resulting in a lower orbit for the satellite.
This torque is derived as:
τa = 0.5(ρcDAaeroV
2)(cpa − cg) (3.27)
where ρ is the atmospheric density in kg/m3, cD is the drag coefficient, which is
between 2 and 2.5, Aaero is the surface area for aerodynamic pressure in m2, V is the
satellite velocity, cpa is the center of aerodynamic pressure, and cg is the center of
gravity.
3.8.4 Magnetic Torque
This torque is resulting from the interaction of the geomagnetic field and spacecraft’s
residual magnetic field. The worst-case magnetic torque is estimated as:
τm = DrEmf (3.28)
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where Dr is the residual dipole of the satellite in amp − turn.m2, Emf = 2MR3 is the
Earth’s magnetic field in Tesla, M is the magnetic moment of the Earth in Tesla.m3,
and R is the orbit radius or radius from the dipole (Earth) center to the satellite in
meter.
The values of the entire set of parameters of the environmental models are provided
in Table 3.2. The values of all the four external attitude disturbances are provided
in Table 3.3.
Table 3.2: Parameters of the disturbance models used in the ACS simulations.
Parameter Description Units Value
ρ Atmospheric density kg/m3 1.04 e-13
Aaero Contact surface aera for aerodynamic pressure m2 1
As Contact surface area for solar radiation m2 1
cD The drag coefficient 2.2
cpa The center of aerodynamic pressure 0.1
cg The center of gravity 0
cps The center of solar pressure 0.1
M Magnetic moment of Earth T.m3 7.96e15
Dr Residual dipole of the satellite Amp− turn.m2 0.8
Fs Solar constant W/m2 1366
r Reflectance factor 1
θ Maximum deviation in the local-vertical pointing rad 1.74e− 4
is Incidence angle deg 0
Table 3.3: Torque disturbances applied to the Spacecraft (Nm).
Parameter Description Value
τgravity Gravity gradient torque 4.7e− 6
τaero Aerodynamic drag torque 6.5e− 7
τmagnetic Magnetic torque 2.4e− 5
τsolar Solar Radiation Torque 9e− 7
3.9 Conclusions
In this chapter, the coordinate systems that are used for spacecraft maneuvers calcu-
lations have been explained and different attitude representations for spacecraft have
42
been provided. The dynamics of satellite and the architecture of formation flying
control laws have been provided. Different sensors and actuators that are utilized
in spacecraft are presented and the mathematical model for a reaction wheel has
been explained. Finally, different attitude disturbance torques that effect the space-
craft attitude maneuvers have been provided and the mathematical models for the





The development of efficient algorithms that can autonomously detect and isolate
faults in spacecraft have been widely investigated during past decades. The complex
system like autonomous spacecraft and formation of spacecraft require intelligent and
autonomous technologies that can perform fault diagnosis in spacecraft with high level
of accuracy and precision. The accuracy and precision of fault diagnosis scheme are
strongly dependent on the availability of mathematical models of system. In complex
and nonlinear systems like spacecraft, developing precise models for all components
can be quite difficult. Due to these limitations in this chapter we propose our wavelet-
entropy spacecraft-level fault detection scheme on a three-axis ACS model. The
capability of wavelet entropy in detecting changes in signals make it a good choice
for use in fault analysis problems. A discrete wavelet transform (DWT) is used to
extract features from the original signals and wavelet entropy is used as a measure
of degree of chaos in the signal for detecting the faults. It is important to note that
in spacecraft-level fault diagnosis scheme, the absolute attitude measurements from
each satellite in the formation is considered as the diagnostic signals.
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4.1 Discrete Wavelet Transform andWavelet Entropy
4.1.1 Wavelet Transform Approach
The Wavelet Transform [107] provides a time-frequency representation of a signal.
It was developed to overcome the short coming of the Short Time Fourier Trans-
form (STFT), which can also be used to analyze non-stationary signals. While STFT
gives a constant resolution at all frequencies, the Wavelet Transform uses a multi-
resolution technique by which different frequencies are analyzed with different reso-
lutions, namely












The Continuous Wavelet Transform (CWT) is provided by equation (4.1), where
x(t) is the signal to be analyzed, τ, s are translation and scale parameters respectively,
ψ(t) is a mother wavelet and ” ∗ ” denotes a complex conjugate.
All the wavelet functions used in the transformation are derived from the mother
wavelet through translation (shifting) and scaling [107]. The translation parameter
τ relates to the location of the wavelet function as it is shifted through the signal.
Thus, it corresponds to the time information in the Wavelet Transform. The scale
parameter s is defined as |1/frequency| and corresponds to the frequency information.
Scaling either dilates (expands) or compresses a signal. Large scales (low frequencies)
dilate the signal and provide detailed information hidden in the signal, while small
scales (high frequencies) compress the signal and provide global information about
the signal. The Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) [107], which is based on sub-band
coding, is found to yield a fast computation of the Wavelet Transform. It is easy to
implement and reduces the computation time and resources required. In the case of
DWT, a time-scale representation of the digital signal is obtained by using digital
filtering techniques. The signal to be analyzed is passed through filters with different
cutoff frequencies at different scales. The DWT is computed by successive low-pass
and high-pass filtering of the discrete time-domain signal. This is called the Mallat
algorithm or the Mallat-tree decomposition [94]. The Discrete Wavelet Transform is
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defined as follows












m,n ∈ Z (4.2)
At each level of decomposition, the high pass filter produces details, while the low
pass filter associated with scaling function produces approximations.
4.1.2 Wavelet Energy and Wavelet Entropy
4.1.3 Wavelet Energy
As stated previously, wavelet transform of a transient signal is expressed by multi-
resolution decomposition fast algorithm which utilizes the wavelet bases to decompose
the signal to components under different scales. It is equal to recursively filtering the
signal with a high-pass and low-pass filter pairs. The approximations are the high-
scale, that is low frequency components of the signal produced by filtering the signal
by a low-pass filter. The details are the low-scale, that is high frequency components
of the signal produced by filtering the signal by a high-pass filter. After each level
of decomposition, the sampling frequency is reduced by half. Then recursively one
decomposes the low-pass filter outputs (approximations) to produce the components
of the next stage.
Given a discrete signal x[n], that is being transformed at instant k and scale j,
it has a high-frequency component coefficient D[k] and a low-frequency component
coefficient A[k]. The frequency band of the information contained in the signal com-
ponents D[k] and A[k], obtained by reconstruction are as follows
Dj[k] : [2
−(j+1)fs, 2−jfs] (4.3)
Aj[k] : [0, 2
−(j+1)fs] (4.4)
where fs is the sampling frequency. The original signal sequence x[n] can be repre-
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sented by the sum of all components as follows




Dj [n] + AJ [n] (4.6)
The equation (4.5) indicates that in the first level of decomposition, x[n] is decom-
posed into approximation A1[n] and detail D1[n] and the next higher scale decom-
position is based on A1 [n] instead of x[n] i.e. in the next level of decomposition the
approximation A1[n] is decomposed into the detail D2[n] and approximation A2[n].
Since the wavelet bases are orthogonal, these decomposed signals could be regarded
as a direct estimation of local energies at different scales.
Thus, the wavelet energy of detail and approximation components at instant k
and scale j will be represented as follows
Ej,k = |Dj[k]|2 k = 1, 2, ..., N (4.7)
EJ+1,k = |AJ [k]|2 k = 1, 2, ..., N (4.8)
where N denotes the number of samples data at scale j.




Ej,k j = 1, 2, ..., J + 1 (4.9)







The concept of entropy is derived from thermodynamic entropy, which can be seen as
a measure of the degree of system chaos. Entropy is a common concept in many fields.
In mathematics, entropy is used to measure the uncertainty of problems. While in the
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information science, entropy is the average uncertainty of the information source. In
other word, entropy is a measure of irregularity of states such as imbalance and uncer-
tainty. A method for measuring the entropy appears as an ideal tool for quantifying
the ordering of non-stationary signals. In the information field, Shannon entropy [93]
represents the degree of chaos of a system. It provides an efficient criterion for an-
alyzing and comparing probability distributions. The Shannon entropy is defined as
follows:
Given a random variable X which takes a finite number of possible values x1, x2, ..., xn





The concept of wavelet entropy is inherited from the Shannon entropy. When a
fault appears in the diagnostic signal, the amplitude and frequency of the diagnostic
signal will change as the system changes from the normal state to the faulty state.
The Shannon entropy will change accordingly. Wavelet combined entropy [93] can
make full use of localized features at the time-frequency domains as wavelet analysis
deals with unsteady signals and can embody the ability where the information entropy
manifests the signal information.
Therefore, wavelet entropy not only can achieve the purpose of information emer-
gence, but also can analyze faulty signals more efficiently. Many types of wavelet
entropies have been defined [93] to solve different problems, and these methods can
achieve good detection and recognition performance. In this work, the Shannon en-
tropy is used to extract the features from signals.




where Ej,k is the wavelet energy spectrum at scale j and at the instant k.
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Window-Wavelet Entropy Approach
The wavelet entropy represents the degree of chaos of the measured signal which can
provide useful information about the underlying state of the system. However, in
critical circumstances, such as reaction wheel operation in a satellite, actuator faults
should be detected immediately.
Gathering a large amount of data and performing a post-analysis is not prac-
tical. Therefore, the traditional wavelets transform needs to be improved for real-
time wavelet analysis. To provide a real-time fault detection, window wavelet tech-
nique is added to the diagnostic basis signal. To obtain the real-time wavelet en-
tropy of x(n) at instant k, a window of the time series must be picked out, i.e.
xw(n) = x(k−W + 1), ..., x(k) where k−W + 1  0, n = k−W + 1, k−W + 2, ..., k
and W is the width of the window. When a higher value for W is chosen more
information could be obtained, however, this implies more storage and calculations.
Therefore, the proper value of W must be considered. By selecting a proper value for
W, wavelet decomposition of a signal is produced as
xw(n) = AwJ(n) +
J∑
j=1
Dwj(n) n = k −W + 1, ..., k (4.13)
As defined in equations (4.9) and (4.10), the wavelet energy at each scale and total













Ewj j = 1, 2, ..., J + 1 (4.15)




j = 1, 2, ..., J + 1 (4.16)
In equation (4.16), Pj represents the distribution of wavelet energy at different scales.
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According to equation (4.11) and (4.16), the wavelet entropy (WE) for each window





4.2 Wavelet-Entropy Fault Detection Scheme
4.2.1 Proposed Fault Detection Algorithm
In our proposed fault detection scheme, wavelet entropy is used for spacecraft fault
detection. The main objective of wavelet analysis is to decompose signals into several
frequency bands. For the analysis of signals using discrete wavelet transform, selection
of appropriate wavelet and the number of decomposition levels are very important.
During the occurrence of faults, the amplitude and frequency characteristics of the
signal will change and the entropy will change accordingly. Wavelet combined entropy
can make full use of localized features at time-frequency domains.
The first step in the fault detection scheme is generating diagnostic signal that
must be monitored for fault detection purposes. In our proposed fault detection
scheme, the absolute attitude measurements in a satellite in terms of quaternion
parameters are considered. The proposed wavelet entropy fault detection scheme is
described as follows
• Diagnostic Signals: In the first step of our fault detection approach, the abso-
lute attitude measurements in a satellite in terms of quaternion parameters are
considered as monitored signals for fault detection purposes. In this step the
quaternion signals; q1, q2, q3 are considered for the next step.
• Window Discrete Wavelet Transform (WDWT): In this step, diagnostic signals
are decomposed into details and approximation coefficients using the WDWT
technique. In the WDWT technique, the proper window size must be selected.
When a higher value for window size is chosen more information could be ob-
tained, however, this implies more storage and calculations. Therefore, a proper
value of window size must be considered. In our simulations Daubechies wavelet
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[107,116] is selected and the number of decomposition levels for fault detection
step was chosen to be 2.
• Sum of Absolute Wavelet Entropy (SAWE): In this step, for each diagnostic
signal, the absolute wavelet entropy (AWE) of the produced coefficients is cal-
culated and then these absolute entropies are summed. In this step the SAWE









where J is the decomposition level of the wavelet transform. In our simulations
we set J = 2.
• Fault Detection: The fault detection is accomplished by comparing the value
of the SAWE to a defined threshold. The fault will be detected if the SAWE
passes the threshold. Otherwise, the satellite is determined to be in a normal
or healthy condition.
In our fault detection scheme, in order to prevent false alarms due to noise in
the system when the SAWE passes a threshold, there is a time delay for declaring
the faulty condition by the fault diagnosis module, i.e. when the SAWE passes the
thresholds and this condition remains for period of σ seconds, then the faulty condition
is established. However, this delay may result in the fault detection times to become
longer but it prevents it from generating false alarms in our fault diagnosis system.
4.2.2 Time-varying Threshold Technique
Robustness in fault detection systems is the essential property that is required for
operation in the presence of disturbances and noise while maintaining sensitivity to
faults. This robustness could be achieved by defining time-varying thresholds [120] in
a fault detection scheme. In our proposed fault detection algotithm instead of using
fix thresholds, time-varying thresholds are considered. In our proposed method, two
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time-varying thresholds are considered to cover the monitored signal. These time-
varying thresholds consist of a filter, with leads the behavior that is driven by the
diagnostic signal. Figure 4.1 illustrates the schematic of the time-varying threshold
technique that is utilized.
Figure 4.1: Generation of a time-varying thresholds [120].
In this schematic, δ1 and δ2 denote the sensitivity parameters that are used to
adjust the thresholds and T1 and T2 are constants that are determined in the healthy
condition of a satellite. For the threshold, the parameters δ1, δ2, T1 and T2 are defined
by comparing the SAWE of a satellite under different healthy scenarios. After these
parameters are calculated the thresholds are calculated online in real-time. Under
the healthy scenario, the values for δ1 and δ2 are defined so that these values produce
two thresholds to cover the signals and detect faults in the system.
When the fault is injected in the reaction wheel, the SAWE of the satellite changes
and if it passes the threshold, in this condition the fault is said to be detected. The
52
flow chart of our proposed fault detection algorithm is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
4.3 Characterization of Possible Fault Scenarios in
Reaction Wheels
In order to be able to develop the fault detection algorithm and to inject faults in
the ACS, the potential sources of faults in the reaction wheels must be identified.
Extensive experimental experience with reaction wheels in different satellite missions
has revealed that the following potential failures may occur in these actuators, namely
• Unexpected changes in the Bus Voltage (Vbus);
• Unexpected changes in the motor current (Im); and
• Viscous temperature faults.
There are three possible fault scenarios in the reaction wheel actuators and for each
fault scenario the proposed fault detection algorithm is performed to verify the capa-
bility of our proposed fault detection algorithm in the ACS of a satellite.
4.4 Simulation of the Reaction Wheel Operation
The simulations performed in this thesis have been implemented in Matlab and
Simulink. Using the high-fidelity mathematical model of the reaction wheel pre-
sented in Chapter 3, we have simulated the reaction wheel behavior for the generated
torque in a satellite. It is important to note that in order to perform fault analysis,
the absolute attitude measurements of a satellite in terms of quaternion parameters
is used as a diagnostic signal and the reaction wheel itself, though being an actuator
of the ACS, is not considered as the system being monitored directly.
In our simulations three reaction wheels are used in a 3-axis stabilized satellite
for the attitude control and in order to detect faults one fault analysis module need
to be dedicated for health monitoring in the ACS of the satellite. It is important to
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Measure diagnostic signals from
the attitude measurements
Perform the WDWT for
each diagnostic signal
Calculate the absolute wavelet
entropy for each diagnostic signal
Calculate the sum of abso-










Figure 4.2: Flow chart of the proposed fault detection algorithm.
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note that in our simulations all fault validation results are obtained with a Gaussian
random noise for the attitude measurements.
Table 4.1: Simulation parameters for a satellite.
Parameters Value
Weight 120 Kg
Inertia Moment Ix = 9.8, Iy = 9.7, Iz = 9.75 Kgm2
Orbit 680 Km
Orbital attitude period 97 min
Initial Euler Angles [2,6,4]
Desired Euler Angles [15,25,50]
Desired angular velocity [0,0,0]
Our simulation data are obtained from the closed-loop ACS simulation of a 3-axis
stabilized LEO satellite. The simulations are carried out for 1000 sec of the ACS
operation and the simulated LEO satellite was in an altitude of about 680 km. The
simulation parameters are shown in Table 4.1.
4.4.1 Reaction Wheel Operation in the Healthy Condition
In the healthy (normal) condition, the reaction wheel works with its nominal speci-
fications and generates proper torque for a satellite. The parameters δ in threshold
formula is calculated based on the results under this condition, i.e. the process of de-
termining proper threshold is based on different operation of a satellite under healthy
conditions.
In order to determine the proper value for δ, different attitude missions in a
satellite in healthy operation condition are considered and the average of SAWEs for
each mission is calculated. By considering these SAWEs in the healthy operation
condition in a satellite the δ1 and δ2 are defined. These attitude missions and the
average of SAWEs for each mission are illustrated in Table 4.2.
In our simulations in this section the parameters δ1, δ2, T1 and T2 are chosen as:
δ1 = 0.00182 δ2 = 0.00165 T1 = 6 T2 = 0.4
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Table 4.2: The average of SAWEs in different attitude missions in healthy operation
condition in a satellite.
Desired attitude Average of the SAWEs Desired attitude Average of the SAWEs
[24, 209, 168] 1.7572 e-3 [89, 25, 17] 1.7840 e-3
[160, 110, 31] 1.7620 e-3 [43, 13, 80] 1.7885 e-3
[355, 126, 200] 1.7674 e-3 [340, 130, 300] 1.7945 e-3
[297, 303, 290] 1.7437 e-3 [30, 310, 45] 1.7802 e-3
[97, 257, 35] 1.7400 e-3 [124, 44, 19] 1.7913 e-3
[341, 166, 350] 1.7423 e-3 [90, 0, 0] 1.7900 e-3
[15, 40, 76] 1.7541 e-3 [173, 137, 86] 1.7873 e-3
[72, 64, 56] 1.7557 e-3 [45, 45, 45] 1.7799 e-3
[84, 279, 159] 1.7563 e-3 [20, 333, 31] 1.7535 e-3
[85, 66, 164] 1.7767 e-3 [0, 90, 0] 1.7605 e-3
[30, 45, 60] 1.7839 e-3 [180, 100, 57] 1.7617 e-3
[82, 3, 23] 1.7818 e-3 [0, 0, 90] 1.7567 e-3
[50, 29, 13] 1.7414 e-3 [22, 145, 35] 1.7590 e-3
[114, 227, 120] 1.7603 e-3 [10, 25, 90] 1.7619 e-3
[33, 89, 165] 1.7585 e-3 [30, 30, 30] 1.7609 e-3
[108, 130, 207] 1.7664 e-3 [43, 80, 34] 1.7577 e-3
[62, 11, 83] 1.7616 e-3 [12, 25, 46] 1.7594 e-3
[39, 103, 331] 1.7634 e-3 [90, 90, 90] 1.7706 e-3
[15, 25, 50] 1.7621 e-3 [67, 87, 69] 1.7823 e-3
[41, 60, 18] 1.7813 e-3 [13, 83, 41] 1.7734 e-3
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It is important to note that the fault analysis in a satellite is performed in steady state.
In our simulations the satellite has reached its steady state condition after t = 300sec,
hence the parameters δ1 and δ)2 are chosen based on the steady state charactristics of
a system. Due to noise in the satellite attitude measurements, if we chose the smaller
values for δ1 and δ2, the false alarms are increased in a monitored system, however
larger values for these parameters can decrease the ability of detecting low severity
faults in the reaction wheel. The time delay parameter σ is chosen as σ = 10 sec.
Figure 4.3: SAWE of a satellite under the healthy condition.
The SAWE of a satellite under a healthy condition and the thresholds are illus-
trated in Figure 4.3. As mentioned before, the window wavelet entropy technique is
used in our proposed scheme and SAWE is calculated for each window. In our sim-
ulations the window size is selected as W = 350. If the lower values for window size
are selected, some faults cannot be detected in the reaction wheel and if the higher
values are selected the computations and storage capacity becomes more complex and
larger. The comparison between different window sizes will be illustrated in Section
4.5.
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4.4.2 Reaction Wheel Operation under Bus Voltage Fault Sce-
nario
In this fault scenario, low bus voltage condition is considered as a fault in a reaction
wheel. In order to simulate this fault scenario, bus voltage is dropped by 25%, 26%,
27%, 28%, 29%, 30%, 31%, 32%, 33%, 34%, 35%, 36%, 37%, 38%, 39% and 40% from
its nominal value (Nominal value =24 volt). These faults are injected to a reaction
wheel in the steady state condition at t = 600sec.
Figure 4.4: SAWE of the satellite for a 27% drop in the bus voltage.
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Figure 4.5: SAWE of the satellite for a 28% drop in the bus voltage.
Figure 4.6: SAWE of the satellite for a 29% drop in the bus voltage.
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Figure 4.7: SAWE of the satellite for a 30% drop in the bus voltage.
Figure 4.8: SAWE of the satellite for a 33% drop in the bus voltage.
The SAWE of the satellite in this fault scenario is illustrated in Figures 4.4, 4.5,
4.6, 4.7 and 4.8.
As the results in these figures indicate, when the bus voltage is dropped by 27%,
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the SAWE didn’t pass the threshold and in these cases the fault is not detected. When
the bus voltage dropped by 28% the SAWE passes the thresholds but the system has
false alarm and when the bus voltage is dropped by at least 28%, the SAWE is changed
consequently and has passed the threshold, hence the fault is detected.







25 600 Not detected
26 600 Not detected
27 600 Not detected













The fault detection times are indicated in Table 4.3. The results in Table 4.3
indicate that our proposed fault detection scheme can detect at least 29% drop in bus
voltage faults in a short and proper time period, however for lower than 29% drop in
the bus voltage this scheme can not detect the injected faults.
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4.4.3 Reaction Wheel Operation under Motor Current Fault
Scenario
The generated motor current from the motor control torque block is proportional to
the torque command voltage and the current is converted into torque through the
motor torque gain Kt. Therefore, any injected fault in the motor torque gain will
be reflected directly as fluctuations in the motor current and as result in the motor
torque.
Figure 4.9: SAWE of the satellite for a 4% drop of the motor gain torque in the
reaction wheel.
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Figure 4.10: SAWE of the satellite for a 6% drop of the motor gain torque in the
reaction wheel.
Figure 4.11: SAWE of the satellite for a 8% drop of the motor gain torque in the
reaction wheel.
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Figure 4.12: SAWE of the satellite for a 10% drop of the motor gain torque in the
reaction wheel.
Figure 4.13: SAWE of the satellite for a 16% drop of the motor gain torque in the
reaction wheel.
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Figure 4.14: SAWE of the satellite for a 20% drop of the motor gain torque in the
reaction wheel.
In the motor current fault scenario, the motor torque gain Kt of the reaction
wheel is changed as an injected fault. In this fault scenario in order to simulate
motor current fault, the motor torque constant Kt is dropped by 2%, 4%, 6%, 8%,
10%, 12%, 14%, 16%, 20%, 25%, 30% and 35% of its nominal value (nominal value
of Kt = 0.029) at t = 600sec. The SAWEs of the satellite in this fault scenario are
illustrated in Figures 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14.
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2 600 Not detected
4 600 Not detected










The fault detection times are indicated in Table 4.4. The results indicate that
this fault detection scheme can detect at least 8% drop in motor gain torque in the
reaction wheel in a reasonable time period, however for lower drop in the motor gain
torque, this scheme can not detect faults in the reaction wheel.
66
4.4.4 Reaction Wheel Operation under Viscous Temperature
Fault Scenario
Figure 4.15: SAWE of the satellite for a 16% drop in the τv under viscous temperature
fault scenario.
Figure 4.16: SAWE of the satellite for a 18% drop in the τv under viscous temperature
fault scenario.
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Figure 4.17: SAWE of the satellite for a 20% drop in the τv under viscous temperature
fault scenario.
Figure 4.18: SAWE of the satellite for a 25% drop in the τv under viscous temperature
fault scenario.
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Figure 4.19: SAWE of the satellite for a 30% drop in the τv under viscous temperature
fault scenario.
Figure 4.20: SAWE of the satellite for a 35% drop in the τv under viscous temperature
fault scenario.
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Due to the unknown working environment of the reaction wheel in a satellite in outer
space the friction model is designed to work under a limited range of temperature.
Since the bearing viscosity is temperature dependent, in the fiction model of the
reaction wheel therefore any fluctuation in the temperature will be reflected as fluc-
tuations in the drag torque. In the reaction wheel, according to equation (3.23) any
change in τv is related to a change in the reaction wheel torque. Thus in this fault
scenario the value of the viscous friction τv decrease 3%, 5%, 7%, 10%, 12%, 14%,
16%, 18%, 19%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 35% and 40% of its value under a normal condition.
Figures 4.15, 4.16, 4.17, 4.18, 4.19 and 4.20 illustrate the SAWE in this fault condition
for a satellite and the fault detection times are indicated in Table 4.5.








3 600 Not detected
5 600 Not detected
7 600 Not detected
10 600 Not detected
12 600 Not detected
14 600 Not detected
16 600 Not detected






As the rsults in Table 4.5 show, the proposed algorithm is capable of detecting at
least 20% drop in the viscous friction in a proper time period, however this scheme
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can not detect lower drop in the viscous friction in the reaction wheel.
4.5 Window Size Effects on Fault Detection
As mentioned earlier, in our simulations the window size is selected as 350. Table 4.6
illustrate the fault detection time for different values of window in our simulations.
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Table 4.6: Comparison of different window sizes in the fault detection performance.
Window size Injected fault in t = 600sec Fault detection time (second)
50 29% drop in bus voltage Not detected
100 29% drop in bus voltage Not detected
150 29% drop in bus voltage 667
200 29% drop in bus voltage 660
250 29% drop in bus voltage 652
300 29% drop in bus voltage 647
350 29% drop in bus voltage 647
400 29% drop in bus voltage 647
450 29% drop in bus voltage 647
50 8% drop in motor torque gain Not Detected
100 8% drop in motor torque gain Not Detected
150 8% drop in motor torque gain Not Detected
200 8% drop in motor torque gain 679
250 8% drop in motor torque gain 668
300 8% drop in motor torque gain 663
350 8% drop in motor torque gain 656
400 8% drop in motor torque gain 656
450 8% drop in motor torque gain 656
50 20% drop in viscous friction Not detected
100 20% drop in viscous friction Not detected
150 20% drop in viscous friction Not detected
200 20% drop in viscous friction Not detected
250 20% drop in viscous friction 673
300 20% drop in viscous friction 664
350 20% drop in viscous friction 655
400 20% drop in viscous friction 655
450 20% drop in viscous friction 655
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By considering the results in Table 4.6, the window size for fault diagnosis is
selected as W=350.
4.6 Confusion Matrix Approach for Fault Detection
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed fault detection algorithm, the
confusion matrix [110] approach is used. A confusion matrix consists of four elements,
namely the true positive, the true negative, the false positive, and the false negative
which are defined as follows
• True positive (t.p.): The number of samples detected as healthy while the
satellite is operating in the healthy mode.
• True negative (t.n.): The number of samples detected as faulty while the satellite
is operating in the faulty mode.
• False negative (f.n.): The number of samples detected as healthy while the
satellite is operating in the faulty mode.
• False positive (f.p.): The number of samples detected as faulty while the satellite
is operating in the healthy mode.
For each fault scenario a confusion matrix is calculated and the two parameters
of accuracy and precision are calculated to evaluate the performance of the fault






t.p.+ t.n.+ f.p.+ f.n.
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t.n. t.p. f.n. f.p. Accuracy Precision
25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
26 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
27 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
28 28 50 16 0 78% 56%
29 42 50 8 0 92% 84%
30 44 50 6 0 94% 88%
31 45 50 5 0 95 % 90%
32 47 50 3 0 97 % 94%
33 49 50 1 0 99 % 98%
34 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
35 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
36 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
37 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
38 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
39 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
40 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
For a total number of 100 simulations for each fault scenario the confusion matrices
are produced. The confusion matrix for bus voltage fault scenario is illustrated in
Table 4.7. As the results show the proposed method is capable of detecting 29% drop
in the bus voltage with 78% accuracy and 56% precision, but it cannot detect lower
drops in the bus voltage in the reaction wheel.
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t.n. t.p. f.n. f.p. Accuracy Precision
2 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
4 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
8 30 50 20 0 80% 60%
10 34 50 16 0 84% 68%
12 37 50 13 0 87% 74%
14 39 50 11 0 89% 78%
16 43 50 7 0 93 % 86%
20 46 50 4 0 96 % 92%
25 48 50 2 0 98 % 96%
30 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
35 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
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t.n. t.p. f.n. f.p. Accuracy Precision
3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
5 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
7 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
12 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
14 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
16 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
18 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
20 31 50 19 0 81% 62%
25 35 50 15 0 85% 70%
30 41 50 9 0 91% 82%
35 46 50 4 0 96% 92%
40 49 50 1 0 99% 98%
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 indicate the confusion matrix values for the second and third
fault scenario, respectively. As the results in Table 4.8 show, the value of the precision
in the motor current fault scenario for 8% drop in the motor torque gain is not suitable
for fault detection purposes and also the proposed fault detection method cannot
detect motor current faults lower than 8% drop in Kt. In the third fault scenario, as
indicated in Table 4.9, the values of the precision for 20% drop in the viscous friction
are not satisfying the fault detection purpose and this fault detection method cannot
detect low severity faults in the viscous temperature fault scenario.
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4.7 Spacecraft-level Fault Isolation
When a fault is detected in a satellite, the next step is to isolate the fault. The
goal of the fault isolation is to determine the faulty reaction wheel in a satellite, i.e.
determine which reaction wheel in a x-axis, y-axis or z-axis of a satellite has a fault.
In order to isolate the fault in a satellite, the absolute angular velocity measurements
of a satellite are chosen as diagnostic signals in our fault isolation scheme. Therefore,
for fault isolation the diagnostic signals are ωx, ωy, ωz in a satellite.
Our proposed fault isolation scheme utilizes the relative wavelet energy (RWE)
technique as diagnostic signals. In order to determine the RWEs, first the diagnostic
signals are decomposed by using discrete wavelet transform and details and approxi-
mation coefficients are produced. In the next step, according to equation (4.16) the
RWEs of these coefficients are calculated. For L level of decomposition in each diag-
nostic signal, one has L relative wavelet energy with respect to detail coefficients and
one relative wavelet energy with respect to approximation coefficient. In our proposed
scheme, the level of decomposition for fault isolation is chosen as 1. For higher levels
of decomposition, the computation becomes more complex and it is required more
storage, hence L=1 is a proper level of decompostion for the proposed fault islation
scheme.
Table 4.10 illustrate the average of the RWEs of the angular velocity measurements
in three axe of a satellite under different fault scenarios. As this table shows, if the
fault occurs in one axis, the RWE of the approximation coefficients are increased in
that axis and the RWE of the other approximation coefficients do not change. Hence,
by considering the RWE of the approximation coefficients one can isolate the fault in
a satellite. Since the bus voltage is common in three reaction wheels, therefore the
RWEs of the approximation coefficients of the three axes are changed.
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Table 4.10: Average of the RWEs of the angular velocity measurements in a satellite.
Fault scenario ωx ωy ωz
Bus voltage [0.9921 0.0079] [0.9922 0.0078] [0.9920 0.008]
Motor current in x-axis [0.9391 0.0609] [0.5233 0.4768] [0.5233 0.4768]
Viscous temperature in x-axis [0.9792 0.0208] [0.5233 0.4768] [0.5233 0.4768]
Motor current in y-axis [0.5233 0.4768] [0.9443 0.0557] [0.5233 0.4768]
Viscous temperature in y-axis [0.5233 0.4768] [0.9797 0.203] [0.5233 0.4768]
Motor current in z-axis [0.5233 0.4768] [0.5233 0.4768] [0.9434 0.0566]
Viscous temperature in z-axis [0.5233 0.4768] [0.5233 0.4768] [0.9794 0.0206]
As the results in Table 4.10 indicate, we can isolate the fault in a satellite by
considering the change of the RWEs of the approximation coefficients. In order to
isolate the fault, we define the threshold for the RWEs of each diagnostic signal. If
the RWE of the ωx passes its threshold the fault has occurred in x-axis of a satellite, if
the RWE of the ωy passes its threshold the fault has occurred in y-axis and similarly
if the RWE of the ωz passes its threshold the fault has occurred in z-axis of a satellite.
If all RWEs of all three ωx, ωy, ωz pass their thresholds the bus voltage fault condition
is determined in the three axes of a satellite.
In order to define the threshold for each angular velocity measurements, the RWEs
in healthy condition are considered and according to thresholds scheme in Figure
4.1 the parameter δ is defined, and then the threshold is calculated online. Table
4.11 indicates the values of the RWEs in healthy condition for each angular velocity
measurements in a satellite.
The value of δ for fault isolation scheme is selected as δ = 0.32 and the param-
eters T1 and T2 are selected as T1 = 5, T2 = 0.4. The RWE of the approximation
coefficients in three axes of a satellite and the thresholds, under three fault scenar-
ios are illustrated in Figures 4.21, 4.22, 4.23, 4.24, 4.25, 4.26 and 4.27. As seen in
these figures, the fault can be isolated by considering the RWEs of the approximation

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.21: The RWEs of the approximation coefficients for three angular velocity
measurement in a satellite under the bus voltage fault scenario. a = ωx, b = ωy and
c = ωz.
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Figure 4.22: The RWEs of the approximation coefficients for three angular velocity
measurements in a satellite under the motor current fault scenario in the x-axis.
a = ωx, b = ωy and c = ωz.
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Figure 4.23: The RWEs of the approximation coefficients for three angular velocity
measurements in a satellite under the viscous temperature fault scenario in the x-axis.
a = ωx, b = ωy and c = ωz.
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Figure 4.24: The RWEs of the approximation coefficients for three angular velocity
measurements in a satellite under the motor current fault scenario in the y-axis.
a = ωx, b = ωy and c = ωz.
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Figure 4.25: The RWEs of the approximation coefficients for three angular velocity
measurements in a satellite under the viscous temperature fault scenario in the y-axis.
a = ωx, b = ωy and c = ωz.
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Figure 4.26: The RWEs of the approximation coefficients for three angular velocity
measurements in a satellite under the motor current fault scenario in the z-axis.
a = ωx, b = ωy and c = ωz.
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Figure 4.27: The RWEs of the approximation coefficients for three angular velocity
measurements in a satellite under the viscous temperature fault scenario in the z-axis.
a = ωx, b = ωy and c = ωz.
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed fault isolation scheme, the
confusion matrix criteria is used. In the fault isolation, there are three classes for
three axes of a satellite, hence the confusion matrix for fault isolation is a 3 × 3
matrix. The confusion matrices for the fault isolation is defined as follows







• cm11= Number of data in the x-axis that is correctly classified as the x-axis.
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• cm12=Number of data in the y-axis that is incorrectly classified as the x-axis.
• cm13=Number of data in the z-axis that is incorrectly classified as the x-axis.
• cm21=Number of data in the x-axis that is incorrectly classified as the y-axis.
• cm22=Number of data in the y-axis that is correctly classified as the y-axis.
• cm23=Number of data in the z-axis that is incorrectly classified as the y-axis.
• cm31=Number of data in the x-axis that is incorrectly classified as the z-axis.
• cm32=Number of data in the y-axis that is incorrectly classified as the z-axis.
• cm33=Number of data in the z-axis that is correctly classified as the z-axis.
The confusion matrix for fault isolation is illustrated in Table 4.12.
Table 4.12: Confusion matrix for the fault isolation.
Fault scenario cm11 cm12 cm13 cm21 cm22 cm23 cm31 cm32 cm33
Bus voltage 10 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 10
Motor current 10 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 10
Viscous temperature 10 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 10
The parameters accuracy for fault isolation is defined as follows
Accuracy =






As the results in Table 4.12 show, the proposed fault isolation scheme can isolate the
faults in a satellite with a 100% classification accuracy.
4.8 Spacecraft-level Fault Identification
The next step after fault isolation is the fault identification. In this step the type of
the fault in a reaction wheel is determined, i.e. in this step it is determined that the
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fault belongs to which categories of faults (bus voltage, motor current and viscous
temperature).
Fault identification is also known as pattern classification problem. In the pattern
classification problem, the first and most important stage is feature extraction. In
our proposed fault identification scheme, the feature extraction is accomplished by
discrete wavelet transform and these features are classified by a multilayer percep-
tron neural network (MLPNN). In this scheme, the absolute attitude measurements
in a satellite (q1, q2, q3) are considered as diagnostic signals and the detail and ap-
proximation coefficients of the diagnostic signals are extracted as features in order to
identify the fault. Figure 4.28 illustrate the proposed scheme for fault identification
in a satellite. As this figure shows, two major tasks must be done in order to identify
the fault; feature extraction and pattern classification.
Figure 4.28: Proposed scheme for fault identification in a satellite.
4.8.1 Feature Extraction
The feature extraction in our proposed fault identification scheme is performed by
utilizing the detail and approximation coefficients of the diagnostic signals. For L
level of decomposition in each diagnostic signal, one has L detail coefficients and
one approximation coefficient. These L + 1 coefficients signals are used for pattern
classification purposes.
In the proposed fault identification scheme, the level of decomposition is chosen as
L=3. The entropy of the attitude measurements in different levels of decomposition
are demonstrated in Figure 4.29 and the values of the entropies are indicated in Table
4.13. As the entropies indicate, when we increase the level of decomposition from 3
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to 4 and higher the value of the entropy for D1 are about 10 times bigger than the
entropy of the D4, D5 and D6. Hence, by increasing the level of decomposition from
3 to higher values the detail coefficients do not contain any useful information about
the signal. Therefore, the level of decomposition is selected as L=3. With 3 levels
of decomposition, there are one approximation and three detail coefficients that are
used for pattern classification in the next step.
Table 4.13: The value of the entropy of the attitude measurements for different levels
of decomposition.
Detail Coefficient L=1 L=2 L=3 L=4 L=5 L=6
D1 5.3234 e-5 5.3234 e-5 5.3234 e-5 5.3234 e-5 5.3234 e-5 5.3234 e-5
D2 N/A 1.9323 e-5 1.9323 e-5 1.9323 e-5 1.9323 e-5 1.9323 e-5
D3 N/A N/A 1.5501 e-5 1.5501 e-5 1.5501 e-5 1.5501 e-5
D4 N/A N/A N/A 5.5564 e-6 5.5564 e-6 5.5564 e-6
D5 N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.1473 e-6 3.1473 e-6
D6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.5748 e-6
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(a) L = 2
(b) L = 3 (c) L = 4
(d) L = 5 (e) L = 6
Figure 4.29: The entropy of the detail coefficients of the attitude measurements for
different levels of decomposition.
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4.8.2 Pattern Classification
The pattern classification in our proposed fault identification scheme is performed by
utilizing the multilayer perceptron neural network (MLPNN). The ability of neural
networks in pattern classification makes it as a powerful method for fault identification
purposes.
Neural Networks as a Pattern Classifier
In the classification problem an object needs to be assigned into a predefined class
based on a number of observed attributes related to that object. Neural networks
have emerged as an important tool for pattern classification. The recent vast research
activities in neural network classification have established that neural networks are a
promising alternative to various conventional classification methods. The advantages
of neural networks in the classification problem are described as follows:
• Neural networks are data driven self-adaptive methods and they can adjust
themselves to the data without any explicit specification of the functional or
distributional form for the underlying model, and
• Neural networks are nonlinear models, which make them flexible in modeling
real world complex relationships.
4.8.3 Proposed Scheme for Fault Identification
For fault identification, as mentioned before, the detail and approximation coefficients
of the DWT of the attitude measurements in a satellite are considered as inputs for
MLPNN. With L=3 levels of decomposition, there are 3 detail coefficients and 1
approximation coefficient for each diagnostic signal, hence there are 12 coefficients
with respect to q1, q2, q3 in a satellite. The output of the MLPNN are three fault
scenarios in the reaction wheel. Hence, the MLPNN in fault identification scheme
has 3 neurons as outputs. The proposed MLPNN for the fault identification has 12
inputs, 12 neurons in the hidden layer and 3 neurons as outputs. The three fault
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Table 4.14: Assigned classes for fault scenarios of the MLPNN.
Fault Scenario Assigned Class
Bus Voltage 0 0 1
Motor Current 0 1 0
Viscous Temperature 1 0 0
scenarios in the reaction wheels that are assigned for three classes in outputs of the
MLPNN are shown in Table 4.14.
The learning algorithm that is used in the MLPNN is back-propagation algorithm
and the learning rate for the MLPNN is chosen to be 0.005 and the activation functions
for hidden layers are selected as hyperbolic tangent and for the output layer is selected
as linear functions.
The data sets that are used for training, validating and testing the MLPNN are
obtained from detail and approximation coefficients of the diagnostic signals and these
data are normalized and fed into the neural networks for training step. Figure 4.30
illustrate the training performance of the network in terms of the root mean square
error (mse).
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Figure 4.30: Performance of proposed MLPNN learning for fault identification.
After the training step, the network is validated and tested with new data sets
to ensure the consistency in the performance of the network. Table 4.15 shows the
outputs of the MLPNN for the three fault scenarios in a faulty reaction wheel. In
order to evaluate the performance of the MLPNN for fault isolation, the confusion
matrix criterion is used.
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Table 4.15: Outputs of the MLPNN for fault identification.
Actual output Network output
0 0 1 0.0189 0.0753 0.9058
0 1 0 0.9901 -0.0098 0.0197
1 0 0 0.9901 -0.0099 0.0197
0 0 1 0.0197 -0.0097 0.99
0 1 0 0.0093 0.9814 0.0093
0 1 0 0.9603 0.0202 0.0194
0 0 1 0.0197 -0.0097 0.99
In the fault identification problem, there are three classes for three types of faults,
hence the confusion matrix for the fault identification is a 3 × 3 matrix. Similar to
the fault isolation case, the confusion matrix for the fault identification is defined as
follows







• cm11=Number of data in the class 1 that is correctly classified as the class 1.
• cm12=Number of data in the class 2 that is incorrectly classified as the class 1.
• cm13=Number of data in the class 3 that is incorrectly classified as the class 1.
• cm21=Number of data in the class 1 that is incorrectly classified as the class 2.
• cm22=Number of data in the class 2 that is correctly classified as the class 2.
• cm23=Number of data in the class 3 that is incorrectly classified as the class 2.
• cm31=Number of data in the class 1 that is incorrectly classified as the class 3.
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• cm32=Number of data in the class 2 that is incorrectly classified as the class 3.
• cm33=Number of data in the class 3 that is correctly classified as the class 3.
where for the fault identification problem, class 1 refers to the bus voltage fault, class
2 refers to the motor current fault and the class 3 refers to the viscous temperature
fault.
Furthermore, the classification accuracy can be define as follows
Classification Accuracy =
Number of data that are correctly classified
Total number of data
(4.21)
The confusion matrix for the fault identification and the classification accuracy are
illustrated in Table 4.16.
Table 4.16: Confusion matrix for the fault identification.
cm11 cm12 cm13 cm21 cm22 cm23 cm31 cm32 cm33 Classification Accuracy
23 3 4 2 26 2 5 3 22 78.9%
As the results in Table 4.16 show, the proposed fault identification scheme can
identify the faults in a satellite with a 78.9% classification accuracy rate.
4.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, a wavelet-entropy algorithm developed to autonomously detect faults
in a reaction wheel actuators of a spacecraft. Our proposed fault detection scheme
requires data from the absolute attitude measurements of satellite. According to
the simulation results and confusion matrix evaluation criteria, it can be concluded
that the proposed fault detection scheme is capable of detect high-severity faults in
reaction wheel actuator, however our proposed fault detection scheme in not capable
of detecting low severity faults in the reaction wheel actuator. In order to isolate and
identify the faults in a satellite, the fault isolation and identification schemes were
proposed based on discrete wavelet transform (DWT), relative wavelet energy (RWE)
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and multilayer perceptron neural network (MLPNN). In the fault isolation scheme,
the features from diagnostic signals ( angular velocity measurements) are extracted
and by considering the RWE of the approximation coefficients with threshold the
fault is isolated. The fault identification is performed by obtaining the detail and
approximation of the diagnostic signals (attitude measurements) and utilize these
coefficients in an MLPNN for pattern classification. The results demonstrate that
our proposed fault isolation scheme can isolate the faults with a 100% accuracy,
however the proposed fault identification has a 78.9% classification accuracy rate. In
the following chapter, a formation-level fault detection, isolation and identification
(FDII) scheme based on relative attitude measurements and relative angular velocity






Health monitoring in formation flying has an important and critical role in the space-
craft missions. It is obvious that formation of small spacecraft can perform the same
duties of a single large spacecraft when the coordination of those small spacecraft ful-
fills the mission’s requirements. Hence, detection of faults in actuators which could
result in loss of coordination is highly desirable. In Chapter 4 we have developed a
spacecraft-level fault detection, isolation and identification (FDII) scheme that was
based on wavelet entropy for health monitoring reaction wheel actuators of a single
spacecraft. The performance of our proposed fault detection scheme has been studied
under different faulty scenarios. Confusion matrix results showed that by considering
the absolute measurements in each satellite for fault detection, high-severity faults
could be detected, however in low-severity fault scenarios the precision of fault de-
tection is below requirements. Thus, development of an alternative fault detection
system in formation flying is desirable.
In this chapter a formation-level FDII approach for formation flying is devel-
oped based on relative attitude and angular velocity measurements. In our proposed
scheme, relative attitude and angular velocity measurements for each two neighboring
satellites are considered as diagnostic signals and wavelet entropy is employed to de-
tect faults in the spacecraft. An important advantage of this fault detection scheme is
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that only relative measurements are used to detect abnormalities in the actuators and
this fault detection method is independent with respect to absolute measurements in
each satellite.
5.1 Formation Flying Simulation Environment
As mentioned in Chapter 3, in our simulation in order to simulate formation of flying
spacecraft, a decentralized architecture is used to control a formation via virtual
structure and a bidirectional ring topology is used to communicate the coordination
variable instantiations, to bring each local instantiation into consensus.
Our simulations for the formation flying were developed in MATLAB and Simulink.
In our simulations, we consider four spacecraft that perform formation maneuver.
Each spacecraft in our simulation is distributed equally along a circle with a diameter
of 1000 meter in the plane. The parameters that were used in our simulations for the
formation flying of spacecraft are provided in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Simulation parameters for formation flying satellites.
Parameters Value
Satellite weight 120 Kg
Inertia moment for each satellite Ix = 9.8, Iy = 9.7, Iz = 9.75 Kgm2
Orbit 685 Km
Orbital Period 97 min
Initial Euler Angles for satellite 1 [5,3,2] deg
Initial Euler Angles for satellite 2 [8,1,6] deg
Initial Euler Angles for satellite 3 [2,4,7] deg
Initial Euler Angles for satellite 4 [1,6,4] deg
desired angular velocity for all satellites [0,0,0] rad
s
Desired Euler Angles [75,15,20] deg
Maximum relative distance 1000 m
From the control point of view, the goal of formation flying control law defined
in Chapter 3 is that the angular rotations and velocities of each spacecraft track a
set of desired angular rotations and velocities of the formation. Table 5.2 shows the
expected settling time and tracking errors that are used to evaluate the performance
of the formation flying control law. The simulations that are performed in this chapter
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have a final simulation time of 1000 sec.
Table 5.2: Expected settling time and tracking error in each satellite.




ω1x 300 1e -5
ω1y 300 1e -5
ω1z 300 1e -5
Furthermore, the gains and parameters of the nonlinear controllers that are used
in equations (3.17) and (3.21) are indicated in Table 5.3.







5.2 Proposed Formation-level Fault Detection Scheme
The formation-level fault detection is unique to multi platform missions. Individual
spacecraft in the formation are considered as different components of the formation
flying system. Therefore, at this level, fault detection is essentially the binary decision
determining whether or not any fault exists in the formation components, i.e., in one
or more satellites in the formation. At formation-level, fault detection is based on
relative attitude information. In this section, formation-level fault detection (FLFD)
approach is introduced and developed. In this approach, the spacecraft are in a ring
topology and each satellite has two neighbors. The definition of a neighbor is as
follows:
The satellite i is called a neighbor of satellite j, if satellite i receives attitude
information from satellite j and vice versa.
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For fault detection purposes, the similar steps that were used in Chapter 4 are
deployed. The difference between these two schemes is that in the formation-level
fault detection there are two relative diagnostic signals in each satellite that are used
for fault analysis. The proposed formation-level fault detection scheme is described
as follows:
• First, two relative signals in the fault analysis unit of each satellite are produced
with respect to each neighbors of a given satellite. These two relative signals
are the diagnostic signals of each spacecraft.
• The diagnostic signals are decomposed into details and approximation coeffi-
cients by using windowing discrete wavelet transform technique that is described
in Chapter 4.
• The wavelet entropy of the coefficients for each window is calculated and the
sum of the absolute wavelet entropy (SAWE) is calculated. In this step, there
are two SAWEs in the fault analysis unit of each satellite with respect to each
neighbor, the SAWE with respect to the neighbor left (SAWEnl) and the SAWE
with respect to the neighbor right (SAWEnr) of a given satellite.
• The two SAWEs are compared with time-varying thresholds thresholdnr and
thresholdnr defined as the threshold with respect to the neighbor left and the
threshold with respect to the neighbor right respectively. If two SAWEs in one
satellite have passed the threshold the fault will be detected and that satellite
is designated as the faulty satellite. These steps are illustrated in the flowchart
in Figure 5.1.
In order to analysis faults, first diagnostic signals must be produced in terms of the
quaternions parameters. To reach this goal, relative attitudes of each two neighbor’s
of a given satellite are calculated and stored in the fault analysis unit of a given
satellite. For instance; the relative attitude signals in the satellite 1 are produced as
follows:
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Measure diagnostic signals from
the relative attitude measurements
Perform the WDWT for
each diagnostic signal
Calculate the absolute wavelet
entropy for each diagnostic signal
Calculate the sum of absolute wavelet

















Figure 5.1: Flow chart of the proposed formation-level fault detection scheme.
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• Relative attitude in satellite 1 with respect to satellite 2 is Q1 −Q2
• Relative attitude in satellite 1 with respect to satellite 4 is Q1 −Q4
where satellite 2 and satellite 4 are the two neighbors of the satellite 1 and Q denoted
the attitude measurements of the satellites in terms of the quaternion parameters.
These relative signals are illustrated in Fig 5.2. In this figure, Qi represents the
quaternion parameters of the attitude measurements of the satellite i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4).
In the next step, the DWT is applied to these diagnostic signals to decompose
and produce details and approximation coefficients for each signal. Wavelet entropy
of these coefficients are calculated and sum of the absolute entropy is calculated for
each diagnostic signals as well. These SAWEs are compared with the time-varying
thresholds that are produced in each window and the fault will be detected if the two
SAWEs in each satellite have passed the thresholds. In formation-level fault detection
scheme, similar to Chapter 4, in order to prevent false alarm the time delay parameter
σ applied to our fault detection scheme. When the SAWEs passes the thresholds and
this condition remains for period of σ second, then the faulty condition is established.
In order to inject faults in the ACS and evaluate the proposed formation-level fault
detection scheme, the potential faults that were described in Chapter 4 are considered
below.
5.3 Formation Flying Simulation Results
As mentioned before, in our simulations we consider four spacecraft that perform
formation maneuver. We assume that the four spacecraft formation evolves like a
rigid structure, that is, the formation shape is preserved and each spacecraft preserves
a fixed relative orientation within the formation throughout the maneuvers. We
simulate a scenario where the four spacecraft start from rest with some initial position
and attitude errors and then perform a group rotation of desired attitude. Here,
we assume that each place holder in the formation has the same orientation, that
is, Q = [q1, q2, q3] is the same for each spacecraft. Since it is assumed that all four
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Figure 5.2: SAWEnl and SAWEnr in each fault analysis unit of four satellites in
formation.
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satellites are identical, hence in this section we show the simulation results for satellite
1 and these results are valid for the other satellites as well.
5.4 Simulation Results for the Healthy Scenario
Healthy scenario implies that the all the three reaction wheel actuators of each satellite
are working properly during the commanded maneuver. Similar to Chapter 4, in our
proposed FLFD scheme, we have used time-varying threshold technique to detect the
faults in the satellites. The thresholds in this scheme are produced similar to the
threshold scheme in Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4. The parameter δ must be defined under
the healthy condition of satellites. In order to define this parameter, different healthy
scenarios were simulated and by considering the SAWEs of the satellite in normal
condition the δ has been defined. Table 5.4 illustrate the different attitude missions
and the average of SAWEs of the satellite 1 in a formation flying mission under the
healthy condition.
In our simulations the parameters T1, T2, δ1 and δ2 are selected as:
δ1 = 3.172 δ2 = 3.038 T1 = 5 T2 = 0.4
The time delay parameter for fault detection is selected as σ = 10 sec. The
SAWEnl and SAWEnr for satellite 1 under the healthy condition and its thresholds
are illustrated in Fig 5.3.
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Table 5.4: The average of SAWEs in different attitude missions under the healthy
operation condition in the formation flying satellites.
Desired attitude Average of the SAWEs Desired attitude Average of the SAWEs
[24, 209, 168] 3.1292 [89, 25, 17] 3.1268
[160, 110, 31] 3.1253 [43, 13, 80] 3.1266
[355, 126, 200] 3.1215 [340, 130, 300] 3.1182
[297, 303, 290] 3.1284 [30, 310, 45] 3.1312
[97, 257, 35] 3.1294 [124, 44, 19] 3.1200
[341, 166, 350] 3.1237 [90, 0, 0] 3.1248
[15, 40, 76] 3.1304 [173, 137, 86] 3.1255
[72, 64, 56] 3.1225 [45, 45, 45] 3.1303
[84, 279, 159] 3.1274 [20, 333, 31] 3.1321
[85, 66, 164] 3.1223 [0, 90, 0] 3.1214
[30, 45, 60] 3.1189 [180, 100, 57] 3.1221
[82, 3, 23] 3.1218 [0, 0, 90] 3.1189
[50, 29, 13] 3.1319 [22, 145, 35] 3.1251
[114, 227, 120] 3.1298 [10, 25, 90] 3.1179
[33, 89, 165] 3.1208 [30, 30, 30] 3.1163
[108, 130, 207] 3.1171 [43, 80, 34] 3.1345
[62, 11, 83] 3.1180 [12, 25, 46] 3.1216
[39, 103, 331] 3.1232 [90, 90, 90] 3.1124
[15, 25, 50] 3.1151 [67, 87, 69] 3.1052
[41, 60, 18] 3.1263 [13, 83, 41] 3.1198
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(a) SAWEnl: SAWE of the satellite 1 with respect to
satellite 2
(b) SAWEnr: SAWE of the satellite 1 with respect to
satellite 4
Figure 5.3: SAWEnl and SAWEnr in the satellite 1 with respect to its neighbors
under the healthy scenario.
5.5 Simulation Results for the Bus Voltage Fault
Scenario
In the bus voltage fault scenario, low bus voltage condition is considered in the reac-
tion wheel in satellite 1 as a fault. In order to simulate this fault scenario, bus voltage
is dropped by 25%, 26%, 27%, 28%, 29%, 30%, 31%, 32%, 33%, 34%, 35%, 36%, 37%,
38%, 39% and 40% from its nominal value in t = 600sec. Similar to Chapter 4, all
simulation results are obtained with nominal level of noise in the satellites. The two
SAWEs for satellite 1 in this fault scenario are illustrated in Figures 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 and
5.7 and the fault detection times for this fault scenario are indicated in Table 5.5. As
the results show our proposed FLFD is capable of detecting at least 27% bus voltage
fault that this fault could not be detected in the spacecraft-level fault detection thar
proposed in Chapter 4. However, for smaller percentage drop in the bus voltage this
scheme cannot detect that faults in the reaction wheel.
The two SAWEs for satellite 2 with respect to its neighbors are illustrated in
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Figure 5.8. In this figure the SAWEnl in satellite 2 that is related to the satellite 1
was changed but SAWEnr that is related to the satellite 3 was not changed.
(a) SAWEnl: SAWE of the satellite 1 with re-
spect to satellite 2
(b) SAWEnr: SAWE of the satellite 1 with re-
spect to satellite 4
Figure 5.4: SAWEnl and SAWEnl in the satellite 1 with respect to its neighbors
under 25% drop in the bus voltage condition.
(a) SAWEnl: SAWE of the satellite 1 with re-
spect to satellite 2
(b) SAWEnr: SAWE of the satellite 1 with re-
spect to satellite 4
Figure 5.5: SAWEnl and SAWEnl in the satellite 1 with respect to its neighbors
under 26% drop in the bus voltage condition.
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(a) SAWEnl: SAWE of the satellite 1 respect to
satellite 2
(b) SAWEnr: SAWE of the satellite 1 with re-
spect to satellite 4
Figure 5.6: SAWEnl and SAWEnr in the satellite 1 with respect to its neighbors
under 27% drop in the bus voltage condition.
(a) SAWEnl: SAWE of the satellite 1 respect to
satellite 2
(b) SAWEnr: SAWE of the satellite 1 with re-
spect to satellite 4
Figure 5.7: SAWEnl and SAWEnr in the satellite 1 with respect to its neighbors
under 28% drop in the bus voltage condition.
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 indicate that when the fault was injected in one satellite the
two SAWEs in the faulty satellite are changed and pass the thresholds, hence fault
will be detected in the faulty satellite.
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(a) SAWEnl: SAWE of the satellite 2 with re-
spect to satellite 1
(b) SAWEnr: SAWE of the satellite 2 with re-
spect to satellite 3
Figure 5.8: SAWEnl and SAWEnr in the satellite 2 with respect to its neighbors in
the satellite 1 faulty condition.
However, as Figure 5.8 indicates in the satellite 2 just one of the SAWE has passed
the threshold (the one which is related to the satellite 1) and the other did not change.
Similar to satellite 2, when the fault is injected in the satellite 1, in the satellite 4 only
one of the two SAWEs has passed the thresholds and in the satellite 3, two SAWEs
did not change. One can conclude that when both SAWEs in one satellite have passed
the thresholds, that satellite is considered as a faulty satellite in the formation. Using
this technique one can isolate faulty satellite in the formation.
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25 600 Not detected















5.6 Simulation Results for the Motor Current Fault
Scenario
In the motor current fault scenario, the motor torque gain Kt of the reaction wheel
is dropped by 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, 9%, 10%, 11%, 12%, 13%, 14% and
15% of its nominal value in satellite 1 at t = 600sec. The SAWEs of satellite 1 in
this fault scenario are illustrated in Figures 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11 and the fault detection
times are indicated in Table 5.6.
The results in these figures and Table 5.6 indicate that our proposed FLFD scheme
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(a) SAWEnl: SAWE of the satellite 1 with re-
spect to satellite 2
(b) SAWEnr: SAWE of the satellite 1 with re-
spect to satellite 4
Figure 5.9: SAWEnl and SAWEnr in the satellite 1 with respect to its neighbors
under 1% drop in the motor torque gain.
(a) SAWEnl: SAWE of the satellite 1 with re-
spect to satellite 2
(b) SAWEnr: SAWE of the satellite 1 with re-
spect to satellite 4
Figure 5.10: SAWEnl and SAWEnr in the satellite 1 with respect to its neighbors
under 2% drop in the motor torque gain.
is capable of detecting at least 2% drop in motor torque gain in the reaction wheel
however it cannot detect 1% drop in motor torque gain in the reaction wheel. As
the results indicate, our proposed scheme can detect both low-severity motor current
faults in the reaction wheel in proper time interval which these faults cannot be
detected in the spacecraft-level fault detection scheme.
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(a) SAWEnl: SAWE of the satellite 1 with re-
spect to satellite 2
(b) SAWEnr: SAWE of the satellite 1 with re-
spect to satellite 4
Figure 5.11: SAWEnl and SAWEnr in the satellite 1 with respect to its neighbors
under 3% drop in the motor torque gain.
























5.7 Simulation Results for the Viscous Temperature
Fault Scenario
In the viscous temperature fault scenario, the value of the viscous friction τv in satellite
1 decrease by 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 6%, 7%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25% and of its value under
the normal condition at t = 600sec. Figures 5.12, 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15 illustrate the
two SAWEs in satellite 1.
(a) SAWEnl: SAWE of the satellite 1 with re-
spect to satellite 2
(b) SAWEnr: SAWE of the satellite 1 with re-
spect to satellite 4
Figure 5.12: SAWEnl and SAWEnr in the satellite 1 with respect to its neighbors
under 3% drop in τv.
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(a) SAWEnl: SAWE of the satellite 1 with re-
spect to satellite 2
(b) SAWEnr: SAWE of the satellite 1 with re-
spect to satellite 4
Figure 5.13: SAWEnl and SAWEnr in the satellite 1 with respect to its neighbors
under 4% drop in τv.
(a) SAWEnl: SAWE of the satellite 1 with re-
spect to satellite 2
(b) SAWEnr: SAWE of the satellite 1 with re-
spect to satellite 4
Figure 5.14: SAWEnl and SAWEnr in the satellite 1 with respect to its neighbors
under 5% drop in τv.
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(a) SAWEnl: SAWE of the satellite 1 with re-
spect to satellite 2
(b) SAWEnr: SAWE of the satellite 1 with re-
spect to satellite 4
Figure 5.15: SAWEnl and SAWEnr in the satellite 1 with respect to its neighbors
under 6% drop in τv.
The detection times for the temperature viscous fault scenarios are indicated in
Table 5.7. As the results illustrate, this fault detection scheme can not detect lower
than 4% drop in the viscous friction of the reaction wheel, however for at least 4%
drop in the viscous friction of the reaction wheel, our proposed formation-level scheme
can detect faults which these faults cannot be detected in the spacecraft-level fault
detection scheme.
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2 600 Not detected










5.8 Window Size Effects on Fault Detection
The sensevity of our scheme to the size of window is shown in Table 5.8. By chosing
W=300, we can have the best fault detection time and as well low calculation and
storage requirement in our simulations.
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Table 5.8: Comparison of different window size in fault detection.
Window size Injected fault in t = 600sec Fault detection time (second)
50 27% drop in bus voltage Not detected
100 27% drop in bus voltage Not detected
150 27% drop in bus voltage 647
200 27% drop in bus voltage 642
250 27% drop in bus voltage 638
300 27% drop in bus voltage 638
350 27% drop in bus voltage 638
400 27% drop in bus voltage 638
50 2% drop in motor torque gain Not detected
100 2% drop in motor torque gain Not detected
150 2% drop in motor torque gain Not detected
200 2% drop in motor torque gain 660
250 2% drop in motor torque gain 655
300 2% drop in motor torque gain 651
350 2% drop in motor torque gain 651
400 2% drop in motor torque gain 651
50 4% drop in viscous friction Not detected
100 4% drop in viscous friction Not detected
150 4% drop in viscous friction Not detected
200 4% drop in viscous friction Not detected
250 4% drop in viscous friction 662
300 4% drop in viscous friction 660
350 4% drop in viscous friction 660
400 4% drop in viscous friction 660
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5.9 Confusion Matrix for the Fault Detection
As mentioned in Chapter 4, in order to evaluate the performance of our proposed fault
detection scheme, the confusion matrix approach is used. From the total amount of
simulation results for the reaction wheel actuators, the results for three fault scenarios
are indicated in Tables 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11.
Table 5.9: Confusion matrix for the bus voltage fault scenario.
Percentage drop
in bus voltage
t.n. t.p. f.n. f.p. Accuracy Precision
25 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
26 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
27 49 50 1 0 99% 98%
28 49 50 1 0 99 % 98 %
29 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
30 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
31 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
32 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
33 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
34 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
35 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
36 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
37 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
38 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
39 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
40 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
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t.n. t.p. f.n. f.p. Accuracy Precision
1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 46 50 4 0 96% 92%
3 49 50 1 0 99 % 98%
4 50 50 0 0 100% 100%
5 50 50 0 0 100% 100%
6 50 50 0 0 100% 100%
7 50 50 0 0 100% 100%
8 50 50 0 0 100% 100%
9 50 50 0 0 100% 100%
10 50 50 0 0 100% 100%
11 50 50 0 0 100% 100%
12 50 50 0 0 100% 100%
13 50 50 0 0 100% 100%
14 50 50 0 0 100% 100%
15 50 50 0 0 100% 100%
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t.n. t.p. f.n. f.p. Accuracy Precision
2 NA NA NA NA NA NA
3 NA NA NA NA NA NA
4 44 50 6 0 94 % 88 %
5 47 50 3 0 97 % 94 %
6 49 50 1 0 99 % 98%
7 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
10 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
15 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
20 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
25 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
30 50 50 0 0 100 % 100%
The results in Table 5.9 indicate that for the bus voltage fault scenario, our pro-
posed scheme can detect 27% drop in the voltage bus with a high level of accuracy
(99%) and precision (98%). In the motor current fault scenario, our proposed FLFD
scheme can detect 2% drop in the motor gain torque with 92% precision and 96%
accuracy, and in the viscous temperature fault scenario, 4% drop in viscous friction
in the satellite 1 could be detected with 94% accuracy and 88% precision level. These
results indicate that our proposed formation-level fault detection scheme has strong
capability of detecting both high-severity and low-severity faults in the satellites with
high level of accuracy and precision as compared to the spacecraft-level fault detec-
tion scheme presented in Chapter 4.
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5.10 Proposed Formation-level Fault Isolation and
Identification Scheme
In our formation-level fault diagnosis system, there is one fault analysis unit in each
spacecraft that detect, isolate and identify the faults in a satellite. When a fault is
detected and the faulty satellite is determined, the next steps are to isolate the fault
in a satellite and identify the type of the fault (bus voltage, motor current or viscous
temperature fault). In order to isolate the fault in a satellite the relative angular
velocities are chosen as diagnostic signals and in order to identify the type of fault
in the reaction wheel, the relative attitude measurements are chosen as diagnostic
signals in our fault isolation and identification (FII) scheme.
Since in our simulations it is assumed that only one satellite has a fault and its
two neighbors are working under a healthy condition, there is no difference between
the two relative attitudes and angular velocities in the faulty satellite for the FII
step. Therefore, in our simulations as we injected fault in the satellite 1, we consider
relative angular velocities ω1− ω2 as diagnostic signal for fault isolation purpose and
also the relative attitude Q1 − Q2 in the satellite 1 as diagnostic signals for fault
identification, where ω1 = [ω1x, ω1y, ω1z], ω2 = [ω2x, ω2y, ω2z], Q1 = [q11, q12, q13] and
Q2 = [q21, q22, q23] are the angular velocities and the attitude measurements of the
satellite 1 and satellite 2, respectively.
5.10.1 Proposed Fault Isolation Scheme
In our proposed fault isolation scheme, in order to isolate the fault in a faulty satel-
lite, the relative wavelet energy (RWE) technique is used. As mentioned before, the
relative angular velocity measurements are used as diagnostic signals in our fault iso-
lation scheme. The level of decomposition in this scheme is selected as L=1. Similar
to Chapter 4, in this scheme the RWEs of approximation coefficients are considered
for fault isolation purpose. Table 5.12 illustrate the average of the RWEs of the rela-
tive angular velocity measurements in three axes of a satellite 1 under different fault
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scenarios.
Table 5.12: Average of the RWEs of the relative angular velocity measurements in a
satellite 1.
Fault scenario ω1x − ω2x ω1y − ω2y ω1z − ω2z
Bus voltage [0.9921 0.0079] [0.9922 0.0078] [0.9920 0.008]
Motor current in x-axis [0.9391 0.0609] [0.5233 0.4768] [0.5233 0.4768]
Viscous temperature in x-axis [0.9792 0.0208] [0.5233 0.4768] [0.5233 0.4768]
Motor current in y-axis [0.5233 0.4768] [0.9443 0.0557] [0.5233 0.4768]
Viscous temperature in y-axis [0.5233 0.4768] [0.9797 0.203] [0.5233 0.4768]
Motor current in z-axis [0.5233 0.4768] [0.5233 0.4768] [0.9434 0.0566]
Viscous temperature in z-axis [0.5233 0.4768] [0.5233 0.4768] [0.9794 0.0206]
As the results in Table 5.12 indicate, by considering the change of RWE of the
approximation the fault can be isolated in a satellite.
In order to isolate the fault, we consider a threshold for the RWEs of approximation
for ω1x − ω2x, ω1y − ω2y and ω1z − ω2z. If the value of the RWEs of each relative
angular velocity passes its threshold the fault is isolated. The process of determining
the threshold is similar to the fault isolation scheme in Chapter 4.
In order to define the threshold for each relative angular velocity measurement,
the RWEs in the healthy condition are considered and according to threshold scheme
in Figure 4.1 the parameter δ is defined. Table 5.13 indicate the values of the RWEs
in the healthy condition for each angular velocity measurement in a satellite.
The value of δ is selected as δ = 0.42 and the parameters T1 and T2 are selected
as T1 = 5 and T2 = 0.4. The RWE of the approximation coefficients in three axes of
a satellite under three fault scenarios are illustrated in Figures 5.16, 5.17, 5.18, 5.19,
5.20, 5.21 and 5.22. As seen in these figures, the fault can be isolated by considering

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.16: The RWEs of the approximation coefficients for three angular velocity
measurements in a satellite under the bus voltage fault scenario. a = ωx, a = ω1x−ω2x,
b = ω1y − ω2y, c = ω1z − ω2z.
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Figure 5.17: The RWEs of the approximation coefficients for three angular velocity
measurements in a satellite under the motor current fault scenario in the x-axis.
a = ω1x − ω2x, b = ω1y − ω2y, c = ω1z − ω2z.
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Figure 5.18: The RWEs of the approximation coefficients for three angular velocity
measurements in a satellite under the viscous temperature fault scenario in the x-axis.
a = ω1x − ω2x, b = ω1y − ω2y, c = ω1z − ω2z.
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Figure 5.19: The RWEs of the approximation coefficients for three angular velocity
measurements in a satellite under the motor current fault scenario in the y-axis.
a = ω1x − ω2x, b = ω1y − ω2y, c = ω1z − ω2z.
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Figure 5.20: The RWEs of the approximation coefficients for three angular velocity
measurements in a satellite under the viscous temperature fault scenario in the y-axis.
a = ω1x − ω2x, b = ω1y − ω2y, c = ω1z − ω2z.
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Figure 5.21: The RWEs of the approximation coefficients for three angular velocity
measurements in a satellite under the motor current fault scenario in the z-axis.
a = ω1x − ω2x, b = ω1y − ω2y, c = ω1z − ω2z.
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Figure 5.22: The RWEs of the approximation coefficients for three angular velocity
measurements in a satellite under the viscous temperature fault scenario in the z-axis.
a = ω1x − ω2x, b = ω1y − ω2y, c = ω1z − ω2z.
The confusion matrix for the fault isolation is indicated in Table 5.14.
Table 5.14: Confusion matrix for the fault isolation.
Fault scenario cm11 cm12 cm13 cm21 cm22 cm23 cm31 cm32 cm33
Bus voltage 10 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 10
Motor current 10 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 10
Viscous temperature 10 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 10
The results in Table 5.4 indicate that our proposed formation-level fault isolation
can isolate all injected faults in a satellite without any misclassification.
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5.10.2 Proposed Fault Identification Scheme
After the fault is isolated in a satellite the next step is to identify the type of the
fault in a reaction wheel. This step in known as the fault identification. As mentioned
before, the diagnosis signals in our fault identification scheme are relative attitude
measurements in each satellite. Our proposed formation-level fault identification
scheme is illustrated in Figure 5.23. As this figure shows, two major tasks must be
performed in order to identify the faults: feature extraction and pattern classification.
Figure 5.23: Proposed scheme for formation-level fault identification.
Feature Extraction
The feature extraction in our proposed fault identification scheme is performed by
utilizing the relative wavelet energy (RWE) of the diagnostic signals. The diagnostic
signals are decomposed by using discrete wavelet transform and detail and approxima-
tion coefficients are produced and then the RWEs of these coefficients are calculated.
In our proposed fault identification scheme, the level of decomposition is chosen as
L=3. Figure 5.24 illustrates the average of the RWEs of the diagnostic signals for
different levels of decomposition. As this figure shows, by increasing the level of de-
composition from 3 to 4 and higher the values of RWE for added detail coefficients
did not give useful information as compared to the values of the other RWEs in the
diagnostic signal. Hence, with 3 levels of decomposition one can have enough infor-
mation about the diagnostic signal. By utilizing the RWEs of the relative attitude
measurements one can identify the type of fault in the reaction wheel. In this step, the
12 RWEs with respect to three diagnostic signals are used as inputs for the MLPNN
to identify the fault in the reaction wheel.
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(a) L = 1 (b) L = 2
(c) L = 3 (d) L = 4
(e) L = 5 (f) L = 6
Figure 5.24: Comparison between the RWEs of the diagnostic signal with respect to
different levels of decomposition.
For 3 levels of decomposition, we have 4 RWEs with respect to three details and
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one approximation coefficients in each diagnosis signal. Hence, there are 12 RWEs
with respect to three relative quaternions in a satellite that are used for pattern
classification in the next step.
Pattern Classification
As Figure 5.23 shows, the extracted features are used for the pattern classification
step. The pattern classification in our proposed fault identification scheme is per-
formed by utilizing the multilayer perceptron neural network (MLPNN). In this step
the RWEs of the diagnostic signals are used as inputs for the MLPNN in order to
identify the fault.
As mentioned earlier, the MLPNN has 12 RWEs as inputs. The outputs of the
MLPNN for fault identification are three types of the faults in a reaction wheel (bus
voltage, motor current and viscous temperature). These fault types are assigned to
three classes in the outputs of the MLPNN as shown in Table 5.15.
Table 5.15: Assigned classes for fault scenarios for the neural networks.
Fault Scenario Assigned Class
Bus voltage 0 0 1
Motor current 0 1 0
Viscous temperature 1 0 0
The MLPNN for the fault identification scheme has 12 inputs, 10 neurons in the
hidden layer and 3 outputs. The learning rate is chosen as 0.002 and the activation
functions for the hidden layer are selected as hyperbolic tangent and for the output
layer is selected as linear function. This network is trained with data under different
fault scenarios in different attitude missions. After the training step, the MLPNN
is validated to check the performance of the network. In the training phase, the
parameters of the MLPNN are adjusted and then in the testing and validation steps,
the network is tested and validated with new data sets to show that the accuracy of
the network is valid for new data sets. 120 data are randomly chosen from the entire
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210 data for training the network, 45 data are used for validating and 45 data are
used for testing the network. Figure 5.25 illustrate the performance of the network
in terms of the root mean square error.
Figure 5.25: Performance of the proposed MLPNN for fault identification.
Table 5.16 shows the actual outputs and network outputs of the MLPNN for
different fault scenarios in a satellite. In order to evaluate the performance of the
MLPNN for fault identification, the confusion matrix criterion is used. This confusion
matrix is a 3 × 3 that is defined in equation (4.19). The confusion matrix for fault
identification is illustrated in Table 5.17.
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Table 5.16: Output of the MLPNN for fault identification.
Actual output Network output
0 0 1 0.018918 -0.00967 0.99075
0 1 0 0.018752 0.990969 -0.00972
1 0 0 0.962059 -0.00812 0.046063
0 0 1 0.018918 -0.00967 0.99075
0 1 0 0.018664 0.985983 -0.00465
1 0 0 0.962071 -0.00892 0.046846
0 0 1 0.036154 -0.00965 0.9735
0 1 0 0.018652 0.991042 -0.00969
1 0 0 0.961794 0.98918 -0.95097
Table 5.17: Confusion matrix for the fault identification.
cm11 cm12 cm13 cm21 cm22 cm23 cm31 cm32 cm33 Classification accuracy
25 2 3 2 27 1 3 3 24 87.78%
As the results in Table 5.17 show, the proposed fault isolation scheme can isolate
the faults in a satellite with a 87.78% classification accuracy rate.
5.11 Conclusion
In this chapter, the formation-level fault detection, isolation and identification (FDII)
scheme based on discrete wavelet transform and neural networks is proposed and ex-
plained. In the fault detection method, the relative attitude measurements were
utilized as diagnostic signals and sum of the absolute entropies were calculated and
compared to their thresholds for fault detection purposes. The results illustrate that
this fault detection scheme is capable of detecting low-severity faults in the reac-
tion wheel actuator with high value of precision and accuracy as compared to the
spacecraft-level fault detection scheme. For the fault isolation in a satellite, the rela-
tive wavelet energy technique was used in order to extract features from the diagnostic
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signals and these features are compared to the defined thresholds to isolate the fault.
In our fault identification scheme, the RWEs of the relative attitude measurements
are utilized to identify the types of the faults in a satellite. The pattern classification
in this scheme is performed by a multilayer perceptron neural network (MLPNN).
The results illustrate that the classification accuracy for the fault identification in the
formation-level is better than the classification accuracy in the spacecraft-level fault
identification that were proposed in Chapter 4. These comparisons indicate that by
utilizing the relative measurements in a satellite in a formation instead of the absu-




Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, the problem of fault detection, isolation and identification (FDII) in
formation flying of satellites has been discussed and investigated. In Chapter 2, the
fault detection and isolation problem was presented and different approaches for fault
diagnosis in satellites are provided. In Chapter 3, the concept of coordinate systems
and different attitude representations are provided and the formation flying architec-
tures are also discussed. In this chapter the control law for the formation flying has
been developed and different sensors and actuators that are used in the spacecraft
are described. Furthermore, the mathematical model for the attitude torque distur-
bances that effect the satellite are provided in this chapter. In Chapter 4, different
fault scenarios that may happen in the reaction wheel actuators are provided and
explained. These fault scenarios are considered in this thesis to verify the proposed
FDII scheme in satellites.
In this thesis the wavelet-entropy technique was used for fault detection purposes
and in order to isolate the faults relative wavelet energy are utilized and in the fault
identification scheme, the feature extraction is accomplished by the discrete wavelet
transform and these features are identified by using multilayer perceptron neural
networks (MLPNN). In this thesis two FDII systems have been proposed for fault
diagnosis analysis in the satellites namely i) the spacecraft-level FDII scheme that
has been proposed in Chapter 4, and ii) the formation-level FDII scheme that has
been proposed in Chapter 5. In the spacecraft-level fault diagnosis, absolute attitude
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measurements in terms of the quaternion parameters in a satellite are considered as
diagnostic signals. These signals are decomposed with discrete wavelet transform
and then the entropy of each signal is calculated. The sum of the absolute wavelet
entropies (SAWE) are calculated and compared with time-varying thresholds. If this
sum of absolute entropies passes the thresholds, the fault is detected otherwise the
system works in normal condition.
In order to evaluate the proposed method, three different fault scenarios in the
reaction wheel actuators are considered. The results indicate that the proposed
spacecraft-level fault detection scheme can only detect high severity faults in the
reaction wheels. In order to isolate the fault in a satellite, the angular velocity mea-
surements are considered as diagnostic signals. In this scheme, the relative wavelet
energy (RWE) technique is used to calculate the RWEs of diagnostic signals and these
RWEs are compared with thresholds to isolate the faults. In order to identify the
types of faults in reaction wheels, the fault identification scheme has been proposed.
In this method, the features from the absolute attitude measurements are extracted
with discrete wavelet transform (DWT) coefficients and these features are classified
using a multilayer perceptron neural network (MLPNN).
The spacecraft-level FDII scheme can only detect, isolate and identify the high-
severity faults in the reaction wheels, thus it is necessary to improve this method to
detect and identify both low severity and high severity faults in the reaction wheels.
For these reasons, the formation-level fault detection, isolation and identification
scheme was proposed. In the formation-level fault detection, instead of absolute
attitude measurements, relative attitude measurements in each satellite are considered
as diagnostic signals. In this approach, each satellite has two neighbors and the
SAWEs are calculated with respect to each neighbor. If the two SAWEs in one
satellite pass the thresholds, that satellite is considered as a faulty satellite in the
formation.
In the formation-level fault identification the relative angular velocity measure-
ments are considered and in the fault identification the RWE technique is used to
extract features from relative attitude measurements and these RWEs are fed into
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MLPNN in order to identify the faults in a satellite. The confusion matrices for the
formation-level fault isolation indicate that this FDII scheme can detect and isolate
low severity faults with a high level of precision and accuracy.
6.1 Future Work
Base on the results that have been provided in this thesis, the future work can be
concerned with the following issues:
• In this thesis, it is assumed that only one fault affects one of the reaction wheels
in a satellite. Hence, the condition for more than one fault affecting the reaction
wheels can be considered as a future work.
• The condition that more than one reaction wheel in a satellite were affected with
faults were not considered in this thesis. This fault condition may be considered
in future.
• This thesis focused on fault detection, isolation and identification in satellites.
Hence, fault recovery in satellites may be considered as a future work in this
area.
• In this thesis the ring topology is considered as a formation topology, hence
other topologies in a formation flying satellites may be considered as a future
work in fault diagnosis analysis.
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